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India’s Informal Housing Context
In India, as in many other developing countries, urban population growth and the shortage of 
planned affordable housing have led to 26–37 million households (33–47 percent of the urban 
population) living in informal housing (slums and unauthorised housing).1 Slum dwellers often live 
in poor conditions and face the threat of eviction or demolition. Unauthorised housing dwellers 
usually have some basic services (such as electricity and water). However, they may lack proper 
roads, sewage, or drainage, and they also face the potential threat of demolition. 
The Indian government has tried many different approaches to help improve living conditions for 
informal housing dwellers, but without sizeable impact. Redeveloping and relocating slums has not 
scaled, improving service provision has been slow, and “legalising” unauthorised housing has been 
limited. Unfortunately, informal housing is going to exist for the foreseeable future in India, and 
there is an urgent need to improve the lives of people who are living in such sub-optimal condi-
tions. 
This report applies a property rights lens to segment the different types of informal housing, to 
understand the size and the needs of these segments, and to identify potential solutions to meet 
these needs. The research focuses specifically on owner-occupants,2 since they are most likely to 
invest in improving their housing as they will benefit from these improvements—both as residents 
and as owners of the asset.
Research for the report involved reviewing 40 reports, speaking to 56 experts, conducting around 
200 qualitative interviews of informal housing dwellers in 90 settlements, conducting quantita-
tive interviews of 517 informal housing dwellers in 40 settlements in four cities (Delhi, Pune, 
Hyderabad, and Cuttack), gathering feedback on the findings in a workshop with 10 experts, and 
feedback on a draft report from 21 experts.
1 Based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition of informal settlements: “Areas where groups 
of housing units have been constructed on land that the occupants have no legal claim to, or occupy illegally (slums); OR unplanned settle-
ments and areas where housing is not in compliance with current planning and building regulations (unauthorized housing).”
2 In this report “owner-occupants” are defined as individuals who are in possession and occupy a dwelling unit. In contrast with owner-
occupants, “renters” pay rent, and are typically temporary residents.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Defining Property Rights 
This report goes beyond defining property rights from a purely “real estate” perspective (e.g. right 
to use, develop, and transfer) to building a life on the property. Therefore, the bundle of property 
rights could also include the right to inherit, basic services, and formal mortgage:
• Formal housing dwellers have defensible and documented rights (e.g., property registration 
documents). These are referred to as de jure rights.3  
• Informal housing dwellers, on the other hand, lack some or all the documentation and may 
contravene municipal development plans or land regulations. Therefore, they could be evicted 
or their houses could be demolished. Informal housing includes a spectrum of housing from 
unauthorized housing where the residents have uncontested ownership of the land and toler-
ance by the government implying de facto4 rights to use and transfer their dwelling to notified 
slums where residents cannot be evicted without due process (i.e., they have some de jure 
rights) to unidentified slums where the residents have no property rights.
Segmenting Informal Housing Using Property Rights
There are six categories of housing in India, including formal housing. Some categories have dif-
ferent names in different government records and some categories (e.g., unauthorised housing, 
which represents over 15 percent of urban population) are not defined or tracked by most state 
governments. 
This report classifies the five categories of informal housing into three segments:5 
• Insecure housing has neither de jure nor de facto rights since their existence and/or location 
is not in any government records. These are typically new settlements and face a high risk of 
forced eviction.
• Transitional housing exists in one or more government records and is progressively gaining de 
facto rights to use.
• Secure housing has one or more de jure property rights and hence, at the very least, residents 
cannot be evicted without due process.
3 Rights that exist because of formal law (e.g. right to use is enforceable by law in a formally registered leasehold property).
4 Rights that exist in reality or “on the ground.” They may be different from de jure rights. (e.g. a person’s right to possess and occupy a 
property is recognized by the community irrespective of the de jure rights or lack thereof).
5 The five categories are: unidentified slums; identified slums; recognised slums; notified slums; and unauthorised housing. The first falls in 
the insecure segment, the next two are counted as transitional housing and the last two are regarded as secure.
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FIGURE 1: INFORMAL HOUSING 
Analysing Informal Housing Living Conditions and Needs
Families living in informal housing are a vibrant socio-economic group. Research for this report 
revealed that more than 75 percent of families in this segment (except insecure housing fami-
lies) own a TV and a mobile phone. An estimated 75 percent of informal housing families live in 
“pucca” (or “durable” 
homes). Their median 
self-reported household 
incomes (likely understated) 
are higher than the World 
Bank’s poverty line. 
Researchers asked families 
if they had “any” fear of 
eviction or demolition. 
The percentage of families 
with “any” fear of eviction 
or demolition was high in 
insecure and transitional 
housing, but was much 
lower in secure housing 
(see Figure 2). In cities like 
Source: Census 2011, NSSO, FSG estimates; State-level data; Municipal Corporations
FIGURE 2: FEAR OF EVICTION
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents 
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Delhi, where there have been multiple evictions, more families have “any” fear of eviction. In spite 
of this sense of insecurity, over 75% of the families who think they are allowed to construct are 
planning home improvements (e.g., brick walls, toilets, additional floors). In qualitative interviews, 
families justified this investment since they felt eviction was not imminent; another reason could be 
that other options to improve living conditions were beyond their reach.
Governments are providing services to informal housing and access to services even in slums is 
high. For example, the 2011 Census shows that 91 percent of households in slums have access 
to electricity, 65 percent have access to water taps, and 66 percent have individual toilets. Our 
517 quantitative interviews showed similar results (see Figures 15, 17, and 19 on Pages 34-36). 
However, there is a marked drop in access to these services when comparing secure housing to 
transitional housing and to insecure housing. Even when access to services is high, the availability, 
quality, and quantity of service provision can be poor (e.g., compared to the recommended one 
toilet seat per 50 people, in reality the ratio can be as low as one toilet seat per 2,500 people; 
water availability for 1,400 cities has been shown to be three hours per day, leading to long wait-
ing times or unavailability for people using shared services—see section Statistics Mask the Poor 
Quality of Services on Page 37). This is reflected in the top stated needs of informal households 
highlighted in this report—toilets (44 percent), water (36 percent), and drainage (28 percent) (see 
Figure 20). In contrast, improved access to medical facilities and public transport were among the 
lowest “top stated needs.” 
Government’s Perspective on Informal Housing
The government’s philosophy has shifted from relocating families to improving living conditions in 
situ by providing basic services and thereby implicitly giving de facto property rights. While grant-
ing formal property rights is desired by the residents, policy makers are uncomfortable condoning 
illegal activity (e.g., squatting). Policy makers are comfortable giving slum dwellers basic services 
and limited property rights (e.g., the right to use, the right to transfer by inheritance). However, 
key challenges include defining the criteria for allocating property rights to prevent vested interests 
and/or unintended beneficiaries (e.g., slumlords, high-income families). Policy makers are comfort-
able regularising unauthorised housing, as the owner-occupants have uncontested ownership of 
the land and the contraventions are considered less severe (compared to squatting). There have 
been multiple waves of regularisation, typically with the imposition of small fines.
The Way Forward
Informal housing has proliferated in India due to the persistent shortage of formal low-income 
housing. There is an urgent need to increase the supply of low-income housing (various ways 
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to do this are suggested by this report’s authors in State of the Low-Income Housing Market).6 
However as informal housing is likely to exist for the foreseeable future, there is also a need to 
improve living conditions for existing informal housing dwellers. This report offers some 
recommendations for specific housing segments: 
• Across informal housing: Improve the quality, availability, and quantity of basic services 
provided by the government (e.g., water, sanitation, drainage, roads).
• Insecure housing: Provide identity cards to 50 percent of households that do not have them, 
thereby giving them a “voice” in the city and fundamentally enhancing their life opportunities.
• Transitional housing: Implement interventions to improve services including decentralised 
sewage infrastructure, clean drinking water plants, last-mile water pipe networks, and greater 
unsecured credit for home improvements (and classifying these loans as priority sector lending). 
Interventions to strengthen property rights include GIS mapping and self-enumeration, digital 
document lockers, granting bundles of property rights (including notifying slums). 
• Secure housing: While secure housing has access to basic services, the quality varies consider-
ably and hence some of the interventions for transitional housing (e.g., decentralised sewage 
infrastructure, clean drinking water plants) are applicable here too. Interventions to strengthen 
property rights include regularising unauthorised housing, creating a credit guarantee fund, 
and enabling formal mortgages (and classifying such loans as priority sector lending). 
6 Monitor Deloitte, State of the Low-Income Housing Market. 2013, Chapter 7: Way forward, p36.
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1. INFORMAL HOUSING  
IN INDIA
In India, as in many other developing countries, urban population growth and the shortage of 
planned affordable housing have forced millions of people to live in slums and unauthorised hous-
ing—referred to here as “informal housing.”1
There are between 65 million2 and 98 million3 people living in slums across India (representing 
around 174–245 percent of the country’s urban population). Living conditions are typically poor and 
occupants (owner-occupants) and renters (approximately 30 percent6 of the total slum population) 
often live with the threat of eviction or demolition. 
The government wants to improve living conditions for people living in informal housing and has 
tried multiple approaches, ranging from relocation to in situ redevelopment:
• Relocation: Owner-occupants tend to oppose relocation because it disconnects them from 
physical and social infrastructure, as well as potentially disrupting their livelihoods.7 A significant 
number of the government-supplied units lie vacant for reasons ranging from inconvenient 
locations to insufficient unit sizes for family needs.8
• Redevelopment: Redevelopment (in situ) by the government alone is economically unviable 
at the scale required. Government-funded redevelopment projects (in partnership with private 
sector developers) are economically and operationally viable when the land where slums are 
located is expensive. In such partnerships, private sector developers cross-subsidise free housing 
for slum dwellers with additional housing or development rights, which have a high market 
1 Based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition of informal settlements: “Areas where groups 
of housing units have been constructed on land that the occupants have no legal claim to, or occupy illegally (slums); OR unplanned settle-
ments and areas where housing is not in compliance with current planning and building regulations (unauthorized housing).”
2 Census 2011.
3 UN Millennium Development Goal Indicators, 2014.
4 Census 2011.
5 UN Millennium Development Goal Indicators, 2014.
6 Census 2011.
7 Kapse, V., Pofale, A., Mathur, M. “Paradigm of Relocation of Urban Poor Habitats (Slums): Case Study of Nagpur City” International Jour-
nal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering (2012).
8 FSG expert interview.
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value.9 Contrary to common perception, 
only a limited number of slums, mostly 
those in metropolitan areas, are built on 
expensive land. According to one expert: 
“It is a common misconception that slums 
occupy prime land. Often they occupy 
land which is on the periphery [low market 
value] or unfit for habitation.”10  Mumbai 
has attempted a number of redevelopment 
approaches. Between 1995 and 2014, 
for example, more than 200,000 housing 
units were built under slum rehabilitation, 
state government, and central government 
schemes while another 108,000 are still 
under construction.11 This is against a back-
drop of 5.2 million12 people (1.13 million 
households) living in Mumbai’s slums. 
Due to increasing urbanisation, the shortage of planned, affordable housing, and limited success 
or scale of redevelopment or relocation, it is likely that slums will exist in India for years, if not 
decades, to come. Hence there is a need to find effective ways to improve the lives of families 
who are living in sub-standard conditions. One solution is for owner-occupants in slums to invest 
in improving their homes. In order to invest, however, many global experts believe that people 
need to feel secure in the knowledge that they will not be evicted, or that their homes will not be 
demolished. Evidence has shown that the improved perception of security stimulates investment 
in home improvement.13 Prima facie, due to limited property rights, owner-occupants of informal 
housing who have the financial capacity to make home improvements may not feel secure enough 
to invest, nor are they able to leverage their homes to get a formal mortgage to make these invest-
ments. 
In addition to slums, an estimated 15-25 percent of India’s urban population (or around 12-20 
million households) live in “unauthorised housing”, i.e. housing where the land is owned or 
formally leased by the owner-occupant but one or more required approvals are missing (e.g., 
land use conversion, building plans). Unauthorised housing often comes up on the edge of cities 
9 Slum redevelopment schemes have two broad models. In one model, developers build housing for slum dwellers on part of the land and 
develop the remaining area for sale at market rates. In the other model, developers redevelop a slum but get Transfer of Development 
Rights (TDR), which can increase the saleable area in projects elsewhere or can be sold to other developers.
10 FSG expert interview.
11 Praja. Report on The State of Affordable Housing in Mumbai, 2014.
12 Census 2011.
13 Payne, B. G., Durand-Lasserve, A., & Payne, G. Holding On: Security of Tenure – Types, Policies, Practices and Challenges, 2012.
REPORT DEFINITIONS
In this report “owner-occupants” are 
defined as individuals who are in possession 
and occupy a dwelling unit. In contrast with 
owner-occupants, “renters” pay rent, and are 
typically temporary residents.
This report focuses only on owner-occupants 
and not renters, as owner-occupants are most 
likely to invest in improving their housing as 
they benefit from it both as residents and as 
owners of the asset.
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on  agricultural land or undeveloped land that may not have been zoned for residential use when 
the housing was built. Unauthorised housing includes not only low-income households but also 
instances of middle- to high-income families living in farm houses and multi-storey structures. This 
type of housing may lack proper roads, sewage infrastructure, or drainage. Unless it is legalised, 
which happens infrequently, unauthorised housing also faces the threat of demolition. Owner-
occupants of unauthorised housing cannot get 
a formal mortgage because their property is 
not formal. Unauthorised housing may also be 
growing with urbanisation. However, since this is 
not tracked consistently across the country, the 
extent and growth of unauthorised housing is 
not fully known. 
From a societal perspective, it is important to 
identify levers to improve the lives of the millions of people living in informal housing across India. 
This paper applies a property rights lens to explore this issue and to identify potential solutions at a 
high level for stakeholders to explore and implement. 
“Unauthorised housing” often comes up 
on the edge of cities on agricultural land or 
undeveloped land that may not have been zoned 
for residential use when the housing was built.
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2. OBJECTIVES  
AND APPROACH  
FOR THE REPORT
OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT
Informal housing is not homogenous. Living conditions differ significantly, as do perceptions 
among occupants of security and subsequent willingness to invest in their homes. Hence the 
needs and potential solutions may also vary across different types of informal housing. Applying a 
property rights lens, which influences perceptions of security, could help to segment the different 
types of informal housing and identify appropriate solutions for improving the lives of residents. 
Accordingly, the objectives of the report are to:
• Use property rights to segment informal housing;
• Understand needs of customers with relation to housing across segments;
• Understand the government’s approaches and challenges in strengthening property rights;
• Identify interventions (at a high level) that are effective and feasible to help improve people’s 
lives.
APPROACH TO THE PROJECT
This project had three phases starting with understanding informal housing through research, 
developing interventions, and dissemination. 
RESEARCH TO UNDERSTAND INFORMAL HOUSING 
Desk Research
The team reviewed 40-50 publicly available reports to understand the categories of housing, 
land tenure, and property rights in India. The team also identified major challenges faced in 
informal housing from the reports. The team collected data on slums from census, National 
Sample Survey, and urban local bodies to help identify the housing categories and the differences 
across categories. This data also helped estimate the size of the different housing categories, and 
informed the design for field research (described below).
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Expert Interviews
The team conducted in-depth interviews with more than 56 experts to understand the nuances 
of informal housing. Interviews focused on the evolution of informal housing, the types and 
utility of informal and formal property rights, the impact of slum acts and policies, on-the-ground 
differences between the various informal housing categories and inputs on the design of field 
research. 
Field Research
The field research included two stages—qualitative field research to develop hypotheses followed 
by quantitative field research to gather data on families and their perceptions. Renters were 
excluded from the field research.
• Qualitative Field Research: Qualitative interviews were conducted across five cities (i.e. Delhi, 
Pune, Hyderabad, Mumbai, and Cuttack) covering ~200 respondents across ~90 slums and 
unauthorised housing to gain a better understanding of informal housing categories and to 
gather material for the key hypotheses on perceptions, customer behaviour, key opportunities 
and challenges. Refer to Appendix 1 for criteria used to select cities and settlements.
• Quantitative Field Research: The findings from qualitative interviews informed the design of 
a quantitative survey. A preparatory phase of mapping over 80 slums1 and unauthorised hous-
ing across the four survey cities (i.e. Delhi, Pune, Hyderabad, and Cuttack) was completed to 
ensure the different segments and types of informal housing were represented in the quantita-
tive survey. A structured survey was carried out with 517 families living in informal housing 
across 40 settlements in the four cities to gather data on the key hypotheses.
DEVELOPING INTERVENTIONS
An exploratory set of high-potential interventions were developed based on desk research, inter-
views with experts and stakeholders, and inputs from owner-occupants in informal housing. We 
also studied reports to identify best practices and potential interventions from other countries in 
Asia and South America. The potential impact of each intervention was assessed based on the size 
of housing category and applicability of intervention. A working session was conducted with 10 
experts to gather feedback on potential interventions and suggestions for improvements. 
1 A full list of settlements is included in Appendix 1.
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DISSEMINATION 
A draft report was shared with experts and 212 provided comments and feedback on the findings, 
as well as on the interventions. These suggestions and feedback were used to refine and prepare 
this final report, which will be actively disseminated to a diverse base of stakeholders including 
government, multilateral and bilateral agencies, private foundations, and the private sector. An 
ongoing objective of the study is to share the knowledge and discuss the high-potential interven-
tions with key stakeholders.
2 A full list of reviewers is included in the Acknowledgements.
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3. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE 
INDIAN CONTEXT
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Land tenure and property rights are relationships between individuals, land, and property. Accord-
ing to Payne et al., property rights are defined as “recognised interests in land or property vested in 
an individual or group and can apply separately to land or development on it (e.g., houses, apart-
ments or offices).”1  In other words, property rights determine the use of land or the development 
on it. 
Property rights, when defined from a narrow 
“real estate” perspective, include rights such as: 
use (e.g., residential, commercial, agricultural), 
transfer, gift, or restricting others from its use. 
However, in taking a household-centric view, 
which entails building a life on a property, the 
definition of property rights could expand to 
include rights such as developing the land, basic 
services, and formal mortgage. Thus, property rights could be better viewed as a bundle of rights, 
which include, but are not limited to:
• Use (residential, commercial, etc.);
• Development;
• Transfer by inheritance;
• Transfer by sale;
• Basic services2 (e.g., electricity, water, sanitation);
• Formal mortgage.
1 Payne, G., Durand-Lasserve, A. Holding On: Security of Tenure – Types, Policies, Practices and Challenges (p. 8), 2012.
2 Experts argue that, in today’s world, basic services are an essential right irrespective of land tenure. The report also draws on Payne, G., 
Durand-Lasserve, A. (p. 21) to take a household-centric view and include basic services as a property right.
“In this day and age, it is unconceivable to not 
consider access to basic services as a property 
right.” – Noted urban planner
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A “bundle of property rights” implies that individuals or groups may have one or more property 
right(s) in various combinations.3 Public housing is a common example where an occupant has only 
the rights to use and basic services, with no other rights from the bundle. A property right can also 
be restricted by a variety of conditions such as time (use is for a limited period such as 10 years or 
99 years, which is typical when government leases land to citizens) or socio-economic category 
(use or exchange is only permitted between disadvantaged groups, low-income families). Property 
rights are also subject to regulations (e.g., use is governed by or has to comply with city zoning or 
development plans, which demarcate residential, commercial, public spaces etc.).
Individually or in combination, land tenure and 
property rights contribute to an individual’s secu-
rity of tenure, which is defined by Payne et al. as 
“the right of all individuals and groups to effective 
protection by the state against forced evictions.”4 
Payne further states that “security of tenure derives 
from the fact that the right of access to and use of 
the land and property is underwritten by a known 
set of rules, and that this right is justiciable.”5  
However, security of tenure is influenced not only by the strength of formal systems (e.g., law and 
judicial processes) but also by informal systems (e.g., tolerated occupation, customary occupation), 
which is common in many slums across the world. Property rights such as use, basic services, and 
mortgage positively influence security of tenure, which in turn has the potential to incentivise 
individuals to invest in improving their homes and living conditions. 
UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FORMAL HOUSING
Under the Indian formal housing system, land tenure and property rights are determined by docu-
ments. Land tenure typically exists in the form of freehold and leasehold, which are documented 
in the records of the revenue (record of right) and/or department of registration and stamps (e.g., 
registered sale deed or lease agreement). In the urban context, the formal records in conjunction 
with municipal development plans determine the bundle of property rights. The rights and restric-
tions are clearly documented and enforceable and thus are de jure rights. 
3 FSG expert interview.
4 Payne,  G., Durand-Lasserve, A. (p. 8).
5 Ibid.
Security of tenure is influenced by both, formal 
and informal systems. Property rights are 
one among many mechanisms that positively 
influence security of tenure. 
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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INFORMAL 
HOUSING
Informal housing is characterised by the 
lack of some or all of the records and/or 
contravention of municipal development 
plans and land regulations. The viola-
tions imply that the government is legally 
empowered to evict slum dwellers and/or 
to demolish the housing.6 The government 
recognises that informal housing has come 
up largely due to the absence of adequate 
formal affordable housing stock (both 
ownership and rental). 
• Property Rights in Slums: The govern-
ment also recognises that the majority 
of slum housing is cramped, has sub-par 
housing structures, and lacks basic infra-
structure (e.g., roads, water, drainage, 
and sanitation). The government has 
historically tried to improve conditions for people living in slums, but has been constrained as 
there were no legal grounds for it to disregard illegal activity (e.g., squatting, violation of build-
ing codes) by slum occupants. Condoning squatting disregards the land owners’ rights (e.g., 
right to use). Also legalising construction without all required approvals disregards the purpose 
of urban planning. The government needed a vehicle to justify improving the lives of families 
living in informal housing despite legal violations. Legislation in the form of Slum Acts7 was 
introduced (starting in the 1950s) by the central and state governments. This empowered the 
state to intervene (via notification in the official gazette) with the stated aim of improving living 
conditions. The Act empowers the state to notify a settlement as a slum and acquire the land 
under eminent domain, which curtails the landowners’ right to retain or sell the land unless the 
state’s acquisition is successfully challenged and defeated in court. In practice, as soon as a slum 
is notified, the land loses most of its value.8 Notification of a slum allows government agencies 
(e.g., Slum Board or municipality) to provide basic infrastructure and services (e.g., sewage, 
6 FSG expert interview.
7 The Government of India passed the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956; examples of Slum Acts passed by state govern-
ments include: Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance And Redevelopment) Act, 1971; Andhra Pradesh Slum Improvement 
(Acquisition of Land) Act, 1956; The Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement And Clearance) Act, 1973; The Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improve-
ment and Clearance) Act, 1971.
8 Under a Slum Act, landowners are entitled to receive compensation that is usually substantially below market value. The asset is also highly 
unlikely to have buyers as the land is encroached and eviction is a long process and without guarantee. See Appendix 3 for an example of 
how notification under Slum Acts can impact the value of the land.
DE JURE AND DE FACTO 
RIGHTS
De jure rights: Rights that exist because of 
formal law (e.g. right to use is enforceable 
by law in a formally registered leasehold 
property).
De facto rights: Rights that exist in reality or 
“on the ground.” They may be different from 
de jure rights. (e.g. a person’s right to possess 
and occupy a property is recognized by the 
community irrespective of the de jure rights or 
lack thereof).
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Land 
Tenure and Rural Development (Glossary of terms), 2002.
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water) to improve living conditions, even on land that is not zoned for residential use. The Act 
also provides slum occupants with the right to due process of notice, appeal, compensation or 
rehabilitation in the event of eviction. Effectively, 
the “Slum Act” therefore restricts the rights 
of the landowner and protects occupants 
from forced or arbitrary eviction, as well as 
giving the occupants a de facto right to use 
the land. However, there is variance across states 
in notifying public and privately-owned land as 
authorities are usually inclined towards notifying 
one or the other depending on local conditions.
• Property Rights in Unauthorised Housing: In the case of unauthorised housing, state 
governments recognise that the violation of development plans has led to sub-par infrastruc-
ture. And the unauthorised status prevents owner-occupants from getting a formal mortgage 
on their home. State governments sporadically announce regularisation schemes, which specify 
the criteria for “acceptable” violations and legalise unauthorised housing structures typi-
cally in exchange for a fee (e.g., fine and development charges). Following regularisation, the 
settlement becomes formal, is provided with services, if these are not already available, and 
owner-occupants can then get a formal mortgage on their asset (subject to owner-occupant 
meeting other requirements by the lender such as income level).
Justification for Slum Acts
The government’s justification for passing Slum Acts (at the central and state government lev-
els)—and to provide de facto property rights to occupants who are otherwise illegally squatting 
and have no claim to the land—is based on the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP). DPSP 
serves as a guideline for states on developing policy. Specifically, Article 39 of the DPSP advises 
that the state shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that “ownership and control 
of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common 
good.” This directive has enabled the state to enact numerous land tenure reforms to redistribute 
land resources.9 In multiple legal cases,10 the judiciary has also interpreted the fundamental right 
to life to include the right to shelter and has ruled evictions as illegal, since this deprives individu-
als of their right to a livelihood. Nevertheless, the property rights to use and basic services are not 
fundamental rights and courts have not set a consistent precedent, since some rulings have evicted 
slum occupants. Therefore, slum occupants can only hope that their slum will get notified so that 
they will get de facto rights to use and basic services. 
9 Basu, D. Introduction to the Constitution of India (22nd ed. p. 172), 2015.
10 Olga Tellis vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation. Retrieved from Honourable Supreme Court of India website (http://judis.nic.in/suprem-
ecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=9246); Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs Nawab Khan Gulab Khan. Retrieved from Honourable Supreme 
Court of India website (http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=14933); T.M. Prakash vs The District Collector, retrieved from 
Honourable Madras High Court website (http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/Judge_Result_Disp.asp?MyChk=43731).
Notification of slums under the relevant Slum 
Act empowers the State to intervene and improve 
the living conditions of occupants irrespective of 
the legality of the occupants’ tenure.
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Slum notification has not kept pace with the 
growth of slums over the years. Nevertheless, 
many slums that have not been notified have 
been provided with basic services (e.g., electric-
ity, community water taps, and toilets) to varying 
degrees. The services are provided by the state or 
municipal government in keeping with the spirit 
of the DPSP. Experts interviewed by FSG suggest that notification of slums has nearly ground to a 
halt but confirm that access to services is improving. In the process of preparing lists for the provi-
sion of basic services under various schemes (e.g., JNNURM),11 state governments and urban local 
bodies (ULBs) are implicitly recognising slums.
BENEFICIARY LISTS AND THE CONSTANT SEARCH FOR FORMAL 
DOCUMENTATION
Notification or provision of basic services happens at a settlement level but the benefits have to 
be awarded at a household level (e.g., leasehold document, individual toilets). The government 
prepares “beneficiary lists” with defined criteria and only the families on the beneficiary lists are 
awarded the benefits. The criteria for the different beneficiary lists vary (residence in the settlement 
at the time of a cut-off date announced by the government, income, etc.). Occupants want to get 
onto these lists and so they are always gathering evidence that will allow them to qualify for the 
lists. Unlike formal housing, however, transactions (sale, transfer) are not recorded in government  
registers for informal housing, which makes the task of gathering evidence even more challenging. 
Records of electricity bills, municipal slum surveys, letters from local politicians, letters from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), local taxes paid, etc., are collected to prove their identity and 
residence at the location.
Renters typically have proof of identification but not of their address, since rental agreements are 
informal and unwritten. This means that they are often not able to get their names on to benefi-
ciary lists.
11 JNNURM: Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission.
Notification of slums has almost ground to a 
halt but access to basic services is improving.
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4. HOUSING TYPOLOGY 
AND ASSOCIATED 
PROPERTY RIGHTS
INFORMAL AND FORMAL HOUSING CATEGORIES IN INDIA
One major challenge in understanding informal housing in India is the lack of comprehensive, 
consistent, and well-defined terminology for the different housing categories. Official sources—
including governments at the central, state and local level, the census and National Sample 
Survey—sometimes use different terminology for the same categories. Some categories have not 
been defined by some state government authorities and hence these categories do not exist on 
those state government records. By consolidating numerous sources, the following categories of 
informal and formal housing in India have been identified:
• Unidentified Slum: A settlement with inadequate living conditions and less than 60 house-
holds will not be classified as a slum in the census. Unidentified slums do not exist in the 
records of the government at any level. Unidentified slums typically have temporary, rudi-
mentary housing structures made of cloth or plastic sheets and lack most basic services (e.g., 
electricity, water, and sanitation). The settlements are typically built on empty land on the 
outskirts of the city, untenable land, or even pavements in a city.
• Identified Slum: A settlement comprising of 60 or more households that is classified as a 
slum by the census as per its definition. The settlement is not, however, recognised by the state 
government as a slum in any of its records, and therefore owner-occupants do not have any 
formal rights in the event of eviction. In some states, identified slums may have basic services, 
either at a community level (e.g., community water stand pipe, community toilet) or household 
level (e.g., electricity). Examples of this are in Pune, where “undeclared” slums, which are not 
considered eligible1 for basic services, receive water and electricity provision from the ULB. 
• Recognised Slum: A settlement that is recognised as a slum by the state or municipal govern-
ment in its records. The classification is based on sub-par living conditions in the settlement. 
However, the slum is not notified in the state’s official gazette under the applicable state Slum 
Act. Thus owner-occupants do not have formal rights in the event of eviction. The terms 
“declared,” “regularised,” or “non-notified” are used in some states instead of “recognised.” 
1 Pune Municipal Corporation. Revised City Development Plan for Pune – 2041 (p. 72), 2013.
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Recognised slums may have basic services at either indi-
vidual household or community level. 
• Notified Slum: A settlement that is notified as a slum in 
the state government’s official gazette under the applicable 
Slum Act. Owner-occupants have the formal right to due 
process of notice, appeal, and compensation or rehabilita-
tion in the event of eviction. Households in notified slums 
typically have access to basic services at individual or com-
munity level.
• Unauthorised Housing: Unlike slums on land that has 
typically been encroached upon, unauthorised housing is a 
settlement where the owners of the housing have freehold 
or leasehold rights over the land. The housing is unauthor-
ised because it lacks some approvals (e.g., conversion of 
land use from agricultural to non-agricultural, building plan 
approval) or violates city development plans (e.g., housing 
on land not marked for residential use). 
• Formal Housing: Settlements where owner-occupants 
typically have freehold or leasehold rights over the land. 
The houses have most if not all approvals required for 
residents to occupy and live in the house (e.g., “occupancy 
certificate” received from the municipality). In addition to 
“planned housing,” formal housing also includes: 
 – Unauthorised housing that has been “legalised” or 
“regularised” by the government (e.g., violations con-
doned in exchange for payment of a penalty and/or 
voluntary demolition of illegal parts of the structure). 
Examples include post-eviction resettlement colonies, 
regularised unauthorised colonies in Delhi, and settle-
ments on Gunthewari lands in Pune.
 – Housing in heritage zones (e.g., Shahjahanabad, 
Delhi),2 religious body lands (e.g., Wakf land), defence 
cantonments, and urban villages.3 
2 Dutta, B., Bandyopadhyay, S. Regeneration of Heritage Urban Space of Delhi, Shahjah-
anabad, the Walled City, 2012.
3 Urban villages are dense settlements, located throughout the city, which largely consist 
of previously rural villages that have been incorporated into urban areas as the city ex-
panded. This is illustrated in the case of Delhi in Bhan et al. Planned Illegalities, 2013.
OWNER-OCCUPANTS WITH 
PATTA
Across recognised slums, notified slums, and 
unauthorised housing, some owner-occupants 
possess “patta.” In the urban context, a patta 
is usually a document conferring leasehold 
or delayed/conditional freehold rights for the 
purpose of housing. A patta is a limited-term 
(e.g., 10-15 years) leasehold agreement, typi-
cally renewable, which gives only a few rights 
(e.g., use, gift; exchange or in some cases 
even mortgage). The agreement is between 
the government and the patta holder. 
Households with patta will be a part of secure 
housing from a property rights perspec-
tive. However, in this report, households 
with patta will not be treated as a separate 
category since informal housing settlements 
may include a mix of households with and 
without patta. During primary research, both 
qualitative and quantitative, the FSG team 
could not distinguish between the patta and 
non-patta households within the same settle-
ment and hence the data is at the settlement 
level. While individual-level interventions (e.g., 
housing finance) may be applicable specifi-
cally to households with pattas, many of the 
interventions are at the settlement-level (e.g., 
water pipe, sewage) and apply to households 
with or without patta.
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SEGMENTING URBAN HOUSING ON THE CONTINUUM OF 
TENURE SECURITY USING A PROPERTY RIGHTS LENS
Just as informal housing settlements evolve spatially and structurally over time, its occupants 
are also transitioning along a continuum of tenure security. Over time, occupants gradually gain 
de facto and/or de jure property rights. A range of factors such as state policy, political patron-
age, and tenability of the land could determine an occupant’s level of tenure security. This report 
attempts to classify informal housing into three 
broad segments along the continuum of tenure 
security (see Figure 3, Page 22).
• Insecure Housing: Occupants in insecure 
housing have neither de facto rights nor de 
jure rights, since their existence and their 
place of residence is “unknown” to the state 
(they do not exist in the records of the state 
government or ULB and the census).4 They 
often do not have identity cards that place 
them as residents in the city. They typically 
live in new settlements that are less than five to 10 years old5 and they may have been evicted 
multiple times. They face a high risk of arbitrary or forced evictions, typically by the landowner, 
and yet it is common for them to return to the same or nearby locations due to lack of alterna-
tives. Unidentified slums fall into this segment.
• Transitional Housing: Occupants living in transitional housing exist in one or more govern-
ment records (e.g., identified as a slum in the census or by the ULB). The settlements can range 
in age from a number of years to a few decades. Transitional housing’s occupants actively seek 
multiple documents to link their identity with their residence as well as establishing the length 
of tenure in the house and settlement. They leverage their political patronage,6 apply for wel-
fare schemes,7 and appeal to ULB officials to get basic services (at the community or individual 
household level), and enter formal government records (e.g., through revenue department sur-
veys). In effect, they are progressively gaining de facto property rights to use. Owner-occupants 
in identified slums and recognised slums could be classified as transitional housing because, 
while they may not have all the rights of secure housing, their settlements’ existence in the city 
is established either in state government/ULB records (recognised slum) or in the census (identi-
fied slum). 
4 Census will not classify a settlement as a slum if it has less than 60-70 households.
5 FSG expert interview and interviews with 50 occupants in unidentified slums across four cities.
6 FSG expert interview.
7 Term used by government of India for support programs.
Amrabhi village—an unidentified slum in 
Delhi
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 – Identified slum owner-occupants 
attempt to get their settlement and 
house listed in state government/ULB 
records and to gain access to basic 
services. The owner-occupants only have 
a de facto right to use and while they 
may apply, they cannot demand basic 
services. Despite the lack of the property 
right to transfer, transactions take place 
using legally untenable forms (e.g., 
“seller” granting power of attorney to 
the “buyer” or bilateral contracts).
 – In recognised slums, owner-occupants 
have the de facto right to use, which is 
manifested in the “tolerated occupation” 
by the state or private landowner. Age of 
the slum, political capital of the owner-
occupants and state government/ULB 
welfare policies influence their de facto 
rights. They may be “eligible” for basic 
services (at household or community 
level) and may also qualify for govern-
ment housing schemes subject to scheme 
criteria (e.g., cut-off date, below-poverty-
line cards). 
Recognised slums have relatively higher tenure 
security than identified slums. However, the 
state Slum Act is not applicable in both these types of slums, and therefore owner-occupants 
do not have the formal right to due process in the event of eviction. An exception could be if 
the state government has an alternative welfare policy for owner-occupants in slums rather 
than notified slums.
• Secure Housing: Occupants living in secure housing have one or more formal, de jure property 
rights. At the very least they cannot be evicted without due process and have legally tenable 
documentation to contest their eviction. Secure housing includes unauthorised housing and 
notified slums.
 – Unauthorised Housing: Owner-occupants may have a limited right to use due to zoning 
regulations (e.g., land marked for agriculture). Their ownership of the land is typically 
uncontested and they have de jure rights to gift or exchange the land. They usually cannot 
An identified slum in Vithalwadi, Pune, 
which is adjacent to a recognised slum but 
has some basic services (e.g., electricity)
Jagdish Nagar—a recognised slum in  
Hyderabad
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get a mortgage for the property (formal housing finance providers usually do not accept 
agricultural land or unauthorised housing as collateral). Access to basic services may be 
limited if the land is not zoned for residential use.
 – Notified Slum: Owner-occupants have 
secure tenure because they cannot be 
evicted without due process. Their de 
jure right to protection from eviction 
contributes to the de facto right to use.8 
The level of tenure security may be lower 
in notified slums than in formal and 
unauthorised housing because owner-
occupants do not have land tenure. 
Notified slum owner-occupants can 
demand basic services from the state, as 
per the Slum Act, but timing of provision 
is uncertain. In practice, notified slum owner-occupants leverage their political capital and 
appeal to authorities to access and gradually improve basic services. 
8 FSG expert interview.
FIGURE 3: TYPICAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES AND SEGMENTS OF HOUSING
Rasoolpura—a notified slum in Hyderabad
1 Landowner’s failure to evict leads to de facto right to use and right to gift
2 De jure right to due process of notice, appeal, compensation or rehabilitation in the event of eviction under the Slum Act leads to de facto 
right to use and de facto right to gift
3 Limited/Conditional: Property right is subject to land/revenue regulations or city development plans
4 Land can be sold legally but not the development on it
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SIZING THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF HOUSING
Understanding the sizes of the different housing categories is useful for creating appropriate poli-
cies and assessing the impact of potential interventions (see Figure 4). Data for the categories were 
obtained from a variety of sources (e.g., census, National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), United 
Nations (UN), state and municipal governments, and urban experts). Where multiple estimates 
were available the most reliable source (e.g., census for all slums other than unidentified slums) 
was used. For categories where limited data were available, estimates using multiple sources were 
developed. For more details on the methodology for estimates, see Appendix 2.
FIGURE 4: SIZES OF THE DIFFERENT HOUSING CATEGORIES IN INDIA
MAJORITY OF SLUM OWNER-OCCUPANTS DO NOT HAVE ANY FORMAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Transitional housing, where owner-occupants do not have any de jure property rights, makes up 
for the largest share (52-64 percent) of slum households. Within transitional housing, identified 
slums—which are not recognised by the state government or ULB—make up a higher share of 
Source: Census 2011, NSSO, FSG estimates; State-level data; Municipal Corporations
INFORMAL HOUSING, INADEQUATE PROPERTY RIGHTS   | 23   
households (56 percent of transitional 
housing) than recognised slums. 
Owner-occupants of insecure housing, 
while a relatively small number, also do 
not have any de jure property rights. 
FEW NEW SLUMS ARE BEING 
FORMED
During the slum mapping and survey, while we actively looked for new slums (e.g., less than five 
years old), we found very few. The finding was corroborated by urban experts and NGOs working 
in slums. A noted urban planner attributes the significant reduction in new slum formation to “lack 
of land to encroach as owners (public or private) are more vigilant in protecting their land.” As an 
example, only one percent of slums9 in Hyderabad were less than five years old as of 2013.
UNAUTHORISED HOUSING IS A SIZEABLE “MISSING MIDDLE”
From the available data, an estimated 15-25 percent of the urban Indian population lives in unau-
thorised housing. The sheer size of the problem warrants a comprehensive nationwide mapping of 
unauthorised housing to understand the different sub-categories. Owner-occupants in unauthor-
ised housing have secure tenure. However, unauthorised housing also requires interventions, since 
owner-occupants endure sub-optimal living conditions due to limited property rights (e.g., access 
to services like drainage, road, street lighting) and are unable to get a formal mortgage. Unau-
thorised housing is not even defined as a category in most states (there are a few exceptions such 
as Delhi and Punjab). Most states also lack policies on unauthorised housing, in contrast to slums, 
which are the target of many schemes. Occupants in unauthorised housing also represent an 
unrealised demand since they have the willingness and capacity to pay for services but their current 
provision may be inadequate and/or inefficient (e.g., expensive water tankers).
9 Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Slum Free City Plan of Action, May 2013.
15 – 25 percent of India’s urban population 
lives in Unauthorized Housing, which in 
most states is neither defined nor addressed 
through policy.
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5. HOUSEHOLD NEEDS 
RELATED TO HOUSING AND 
LIVING CONDITIONS
A survey of 517 households (only owner-occupants and not renters) across Pune, Hyderabad, 
Cuttack, and Delhi was undertaken to understand the demographics, current conditions, needs, 
challenges, and aspirations of households in the different categories of informal housing. In this 
report, data for “secure” housing includes notified slums and unauthorised housing only. 
OWNER-OCCUPANTS IN INFORMAL HOUSING ARE A VIBRANT 
ECONOMIC GROUP
Owner-occupants reported median monthly household incomes of INR1 6,000 (USD $90) in 
insecure housing, INR 8,000 (USD $120) in transitional housing and INR 9,000 (USD $134) in 
secure housing (see Figure 5). Actual incomes of owner-occupants may be higher because self-
reported incomes are often understated. Even stated incomes are higher than the World Bank 
poverty line of INR 5,068 per month2 (USD $76) for a family of five at Purchasing Price Parity (PPP) 
of $1.90 per capita per day adjusted for 2015. 
INFORMAL HOUSING OWNER-OCCUPANTS PURCHASE CONSUMER GOODS 
AND PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICES
According to FSG’s survey, penetration of consumer goods and private sector services is high, 
with 83 percent and 92 percent of households using televisions and mobile phones, respectively. 
In comparison, the urban average is 77 percent of households using televisions and 64 percent 
of households owning mobile phones according to the 2011 census data (see Figure 6). Informal 
housing owner-occupants seem to regularly access and pay for premium television services (in 
qualitative interviews, most respondents said they primarily use satellite dish or digital set top box).
1 INR: Indian Rupee.
2 World Bank Poverty Line is $1.90 per capita per day in 2011 prices. Using 2015 PPP conversion rate from international $ to local currency 
unit of 17.78 (OECD), the poverty line is INR 33.79 per capita per day. For a family of five (average household size in FSG survey of 517 
households) and assuming 30 days per month, the poverty line is INR 5,067.30 per household per month.
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FIGURE 5: MEDIAN SELF-REPORTED MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME
FIGURE 6: PENETRATION OF CONSUMER GOODS
THE MAJORITY OF INFORMAL HOUSING OWNER-OCCUPANTS LIVE IN 
“PUCCA” STRUCTURES
An estimated 75 percent of owner-occupants in informal housing live in “pucca” structures (see 
Figure 7). The types of housing structures within each category are based on NSSO data (where 
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents
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available) and field visits and customer surveys carried out as part of this project (when NSSO data 
was not available). NSSO definitions for housing structures are:
• Katcha: Walls and roofs made of unburnt bricks, bamboo, mud, grass, leaves, reeds, thatch, 
etc.
• Semi-pucca: Either walls or roof made of pucca materials but not both.
• Pucca: Walls and roofs made of cement, concrete, oven-burnt bricks, hollow cement/ash 
bricks, stone, stone blocks, jack boards (cement plastered reeds), iron, zinc or other metal 
sheets, timber, tiles, slate, corrugated iron, asbestos cement sheet, veneer, plywood, artificial 
wood of synthetic material, and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) material. 
FIGURE 7: TYPE OF STRUCTURES ACROSS HOUSING CATEGORIES
In the mapping and survey exercise, we observed that housing structures are not uniform, 
especially in transitional housing. Katcha, semi-pucca, pucca structures and even one storey 
(Ground + 1) structures exist next to each other. Interestingly, even in transitional housing, where 
owner-occupants have no de jure property rights, more than 40 percent of structures are pucca 
and another 34 percent are semi-pucca structures (e.g., with concrete walls). This finding was in 
contrast to the image of slums comprising structures made with rudimentary materials. However, 
at the same time it should be recognised that the number of households with pucca structures in 
transitional housing is less than that in secure housing.
NSSO definitions for housing structures
• Katcha: Walls and roofs made of unburnt bricks, bamboo, mud, grass, leaves, reeds, thatch, etc.
• Semi-Pucca: Either walls or roof made of pucca materials but not both
• Pucca: Walls and roofs made of cement, concrete, oven burnt bricks, hollow cement/ash bricks, stone, stone blocks, jack boards (ce-
ment plastered reeds), iron, zinc or other metal sheets, timber, tiles, slate, corrugated iron, asbestos cement sheet, veneer, plywood, 
artificial wood of synthetic material, and poly vinyl chloride (PVC) material. 
Source: Census 2011, NSSO, FSG estimates; State-level data; Municipal Corporations
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PERCEIVED SECURITY OF TENURE IS LOW FOR OWNER-
OCCUPANTS IN INSECURE HOUSING AND TRANSITIONAL 
HOUSING
Payne et al. state that “perceptions of tenure security are prompting many of the actions that 
formal title is meant to ensure, such as access to credit and investment [to upgrade housing].”3 To 
understand this in the Indian context, we mapped actions (e.g., investing) against the perception 
of tenure security. In the survey owner-occupants were asked if they had “any fear of eviction 
or demolition” (hereafter referred to as “any” fear of eviction) as an inverse measure of their 
perceived security of tenure.
SHARE OF OWNER-OCCUPANTS WHO HAVE “ANY” FEAR OF EVICTION4 
IS HIGH IN INSECURE AND TRANSITIONAL HOUSING, BUT DROPS 
SIGNIFICANTLY IN SECURE HOUSING
Of the surveyed households, around 78 percent of owner-occupants in insecure housing and 68 
percent of owner-occupants in transitional housing reported “any” fear of eviction compared to 28 
percent of respondents living in secure housing (see Figure 9). Nearly one-third of the respondents 
living in insecure housing and transitional housing reported that there had been an increase in 
this fear. In secure housing, on the 
other hand, it had decreased. In cities 
like Delhi, which have seen multiple 
instances of evictions or demolitions,5 
the share of owner-occupants who have 
“any” fear of eviction is relatively higher 
(e.g., 88 percent in transitional housing 
compared to 50-60 percent in Pune 
and Hyderabad; 46 percent in secure 
housing compared to 10-20 percent in 
Pune and Hyderabad). 
3 Payne,  G., Durand-Lasserve, A. (p. 23).
4 Owner-occupants were asked “Do you have any fear that you will be evicted or your house demolished by the government?”
5 Bhan, G. (Un)Settling the City, 2013.
FIGURE 8: A VARIETY OF STRUCTURES OBSERVED IN A 
SETTLEMENT IN DELHI
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FIGURE 9: HOUSEHOLDS WITH “ANY” FEAR OF EVICTION AND CHANGE IN THIS FEAR OVER THE 
LAST FIVE YEARS
FIGURE 10: OWNER-OCCUPANTS WHO HAVE BEEN EVICTED OR THEIR HOMES DEMOLISHED IN THE 
PAST BY HOUSING GROUP IN EACH CITY
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents 
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents 
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Owner-occupants in transitional housing attributed “any” fear of eviction to the illegal 
construction of the house, lack of notified status for the slum, lack of documents to prove 
ownership and past evictions (see Figure 11).
FIGURE 11: REASONS FOR “ANY” FEAR OF EVICTION IN THE THREE CATEGORIES
DESPITE HAVING SOME FEAR OF EVICTION, HOUSEHOLDS PLAN TO 
CONSTRUCT AND IMPROVE THEIR HOMES IN THE FUTURE
A large proportion (44 percent) of owner-
occupants surveyed by FSG believed they were 
not allowed to construct. Of the 56 percent of 
households that believed they were allowed to 
construct, 37 percent had “any” fear of eviction. 
Of these, 82 percent nevertheless planned to 
invest in their homes (see Figure 12). In qualitative 
interviews, owner-occupants were comfortable 
investing significant amounts (sometimes most of 
their savings) in improving their homes and gave the impression that they did not feel eviction was 
imminent.
“Technically I don’t own the land so I should be a 
little scared right? But since I have lived here for 
more than 20 years I don’t see any problem.” – 
Owner-occupant in transitional housing in Pune
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents
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OWNER-OCCUPANTS THAT DO NOT HAVE “ANY” FEAR OF EVICTION 
DERIVE THEIR PERCEPTION OF TENURE SECURITY FROM LEGALLY 
UNTENABLE SOURCES
The perception of tenure security is derived from many factors, including living in the same house 
and settlement for many years, infrastructure improvement in the settlement, and a variety of 
documents. Incidentally, the documents typically cited (e.g., power of attorney from previous 
owner-occupant, receipts for utility payments and/or ULB taxes) do not really give owner-
occupants any property rights, not even de jure property rights to use. Only owner-occupants of 
notified slums or unauthorised housing may have legally tenable documents (e.g., slum ID card or 
possession certificates in notified slums and land titles in unauthorised housing). 
FIGURE 12: RESPONDENTS WITH “ANY” FEAR OF EVICTION AND PLAN TO CONSTRUCT IN THE 
FUTURE
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents 
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ACCESS TO SERVICES VARIES ACROSS HOUSING CATEGORIES
In most informal housing except insecure housing, state governments and urban local bodies are 
providing basic services (e.g., water, toilets). Even schemes do not typically link provision of services 
to land tenure or property rights (e.g., Swacch Bharat Abhiyan for sanitation).6 
FIGURE 13: REASONS FOR NOT FEARING EVICTION
Numerous court judgements have supported the provision of basic services, irrespective of 
land tenure, as a part of the right to shelter, which is included in the expanded scope of the 
fundamental right to life. 
6 FSG expert interview.
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents
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Consequently, access to basic services is high, as is evident from the 2011 Census data on slums, 
which cover notified, recognised, and identified slum categories:
• 91 percent of slum households have access to electricity;
• 65 percent of slum households have access to water taps from a treated source;
• 66 percent of slum households have individual toilets and 15 percent have access to public 
toilets.
FSG’s quantitative survey data on access to electricity, water, and toilets in slums is broadly 
consistent with the 2011 Census data with one exception (see Figure 19). Data on toilets differed 
significantly in Cuttack and Delhi. This report does not have any comparative data for unauthorised 
housing since the 2011 Census and the NSSO do not recognise such a housing category. 
EXCEPT IN INSECURE HOUSING, ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY IS NEAR 
UNIVERSAL ALTHOUGH THE PRESENCE OF INDIVIDUAL METERED 
CONNECTIONS IS NOT
Most households, except some in 
insecure housing, have electricity, 
often with individual metered 
connections (see Figure 15). In secure 
housing, more than 90 percent of 
households have individual metered 
connections, except in Cuttack. The 
likelihood of possession of individual 
metered connections reduces as 
security of tenure reduces. In Pune, 
for instance, only 50 percent of 
households surveyed in transitional 
housing had an individual metered 
connection compared to 91 percent of 
households in secure housing. Some 
owner-occupants without individual 
metered connections—e.g., who accessed electricity through a neighbour’s connection—did 
not appear worried about it (i.e. there were no negative connotations associated with lack of an 
individual metered connection).
FIGURE 14: ELECTRICITY CONNECTIONS INCLUDING 
INDIVIDUAL AND “SHARED” CONNECTIONS IN A SLUM 
IN MUMBAI
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FIGURE 15: ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (WITH OR WITHOUT INDIVIDUAL METERED CONNECTION)
Possession of Individual Taps is Low 
and Access to Clean Drinking Water 
is Not Ubiquitous
Tap water through individual, in-house 
connections (henceforth referred to as 
individual taps) is available only in a minority 
of households, especially in Cuttack and 
Delhi (see Figure 17). Fewer than half of 
the households in transitional housing 
and insecure housing have individual taps. 
The prevalence of individual taps in secure 
housing is much higher in Pune, but is only 
33 percent in Delhi and Cuttack. Overall 
access to clean drinking water is significantly higher than penetration of individual taps due to 
other sources of clean drinking water (e.g., shared taps, public stand pipes, water tankers). 
* Access can be through individual metered connection, shared connection with neighbour(s), or illegal connections.
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents ; Census 2011 Slum Abstract
FIGURE 16: RESIDENTS IN HYDERABAD USING A 
WATER TANKER DUE TO INADEQUATE SUPPLY 
FROM TAPS
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FIGURE 17: POSSESSION OF INDIVIDUAL TAPS AND ACCESS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER 
Drainage is Common Only in 
Secure Housing
Only 57 percent of households surveyed 
by FSG in informal housing had access 
to drainage (open or closed) compared 
to 81 percent of slum households, 
according to the 2011 Census. 
Households in secure housing had 
better provision of drainage (72 percent 
of households) compared to less than 
half (46 percent) of households in 
transitional housing.7  
7 FSG quantitative interviews of 517 households in informal housing.
* Access can be from a source outside the house (e.g. community stand pipe, tankers, or purchased from diverse sources)
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents ; Census 2011 Slum Abstract
FIGURE 18: OPEN DRAINAGE ALONGSIDE A WATER 
PIPE NETWORK IN A NOTIFIED SLUM IN PUNE
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Access to Sanitation is Primarily Through Community Toilets, Except in Hyderabad
Overall access to toilets is high, except in Cuttack, but there are differences in the type of access 
(see Figure 19). Unlike Pune and Delhi, where public toilets play a significant role in providing 
access to sanitation, Hyderabad has a high share of households with individual toilets. Households 
in secure housing have a much higher provision of individual toilets. In contrast, households in 
insecure housing have the worst access to sanitation, including community toilets, with most 
households defecating in the open.
FIGURE 19: ACCESS TO SANITATION 
ACCESS TO SERVICES IMPROVES FROM INSECURE HOUSING TO SECURE 
HOUSING 
In general, insecure housing has poor provision of services. While electricity provision is nearly 
ubiquitous in transitional housing and secure housing, when comparing access to in-house water 
taps and individual toilets, the difference is stark. Transitional housing has lower provision of basic 
services than secure housing. 
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents ; Census 2011 Slum Abstract
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The difference in service levels amongst various categories of informal housing can be attributed to 
the following:
• Municipal Bodies: These bodies have limited capacity and resources. They are likely to pri-
oritise notified slums over other slums when providing infrastructure8 and basic services (e.g., 
electricity, water) because provision to notified slums is mandated in the Slum Act. In others 
slums, apart from tenure status, age of the slum and political patronage are among the factors 
that influence prioritisation by municipal bodies.
• Legal Restrictions: In Delhi, the local water utility (Delhi Jal Board) is not legally allowed to 
provide individual connections to slums as they are illegal settlements.9,10  Governments are 
often wary of constructing structures like public toilets on private land and may restrict them-
selves to extending trunk infrastructure to slums on private land.11
• Availability of Trunk Infrastructure: In settlements with access to municipal trunk infrastruc-
ture, households with the means (savings or loans) and space have invested in building their 
own toilets with connections to the sewage infrastructure.
STATISTICS MASK THE POOR QUALITY OF SERVICES
Infrastructure such as water supply and public toilets is limited and often severely stretched. 
Compared to the recommended one toilet seat per 50 people,12 in reality the ratio can be as high 
as 2,500 people per toilet seat.13 As a result, queues at public toilets are long and waiting times 
can be as long as two hours in some communities in Mumbai.14 Municipal water supply is typically 
available only for a few hours per day.
According to the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) Service Level Benchmarks of 1,405 cities, 
only five cities have ~24 hour water availability, and the national average for the remaining 1,400 
cities is three hours per day.15 This is especially problematic for people accessing community taps. 
People may spend hours waiting for water that is often released at odd hours and the duration 
may be inadequate for everyone to get enough water. Households may resort to paying for more 
expensive sources such as water tankers. Hence while access to treated tap water is high, as per 
the 2011 Census, the availability, quality and quantity of provision may be very poor. 
8 FSG expert interviews.
9 Banerjee, A., Pande, R., Vaidya, Y., Walton, M., & Weaver, J. Delhi’s Slum-Dwellers: Deprivation, Preferences and Political Engagement 
among the Urban Poor, 2011.
10 Centre for Urban and Regional Excellence (CURE), sourced from Delhi Jal Board website.
11 FSG expert Interviews.
12 National Urban Sanitation Policy.
13 Kalpana Chawla, journalist and author of Rediscovering Dharavi: Stories from Asia’s Largest Slum; retrieved from Infochange India (http://
infochangeindia.org/urban-india/cityscapes/why-public-toilets-get-clogged.html).
14 Murthy, S. L. Land security and the challenges of realizing the human right to water and sanitation in the slums of Mumbai, India, 2012.
15 Ministry of Urban Development, Service Levels in Urban Water and Sanitation Sector, 2012.
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STATED NEEDS APPEAR TO BE FOCUSED ON DAY-TO-DAY 
CHALLENGES
Insecure households’ top needs reflect the lack of basic services—toilets, water, and electricity. 
Even transitional households want toilets, water, and drainage (see Figure 20). The need for formal 
property rights (e.g., patta or regularisation) was mentioned mainly by households living in insecure 
housing and transitional housing (about 25 percent of them mentioned it), perhaps because having 
secure tenure increases the likelihood of getting basic services. As an example, a slum in Mumbai 
is not provided with sanitation facilities by the ULB because, according to an Assistant Municipal 
Commissioner: “Since it is a transit camp, MCGM [ULB] cannot provide a toilet. If they shift, the 
investment will be wasted. It is also not a notified slum.”16 
FIGURE 20: INFORMAL HOUSING CUSTOMER NEEDS
16 Indian Express, Transit camp without functional toilet blocks: Right to proper sanitation violated at Mankhurd. Mumbai, 2016.
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents 
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OWNER-OCCUPANTS ARE INVESTING IN HOME IMPROVEMENT 
REGARDLESS OF TENURE SECURITY
60 percent of households in transitional housing and 29 percent in households in secure housing 
believe they are not “allowed to construct.” Of those who believe that they are “allowed to 
construct”, the majority of owner-occupants have built in the past and many more plan to build 
in the future (see Figure 21). This may seem counterintuitive, given that a large proportion of 
these households (especially those in transitional housing) have mentioned low tenure security (as 
measured by “any” fear of eviction in Figure 9). This may be because, while the majority of owner-
occupants have “any” fear of eviction, they may not perceive “any” fear of eviction as imminent, 
which allows them to justify the investment. It is also possible that while they do have “any” fear 
of eviction, they want to improve their living conditions and may not have other options. 
In qualitative interviews, owner-occupants said that the decision to build was often made based 
on years of living at the same place, availability of funds, and consultations with local leaders. Not 
all risks pay off, however, as some owner-occupants, especially in insecure housing and identified 
slums, have been evicted in the past and their homes have been demolished. 
FIGURE 21: PAST AND FUTURE CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY
Note: N is lower as only respondents who are “allowed to construct” were asked if they plan to construct in the future
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents 
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FIGURE 22: TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES PLANNED
There is a perception that, due to low tenure security, owner-occupants undertake incremental 
construction to lower their losses in case of eviction or demolition. However, owner-occupants 
interviewed said that incremental construction is done due to budgetary constraints. As seen 
from Figure 22, the most common upgrades planned are replacing walls/roof with metal sheets 
or building a toilet costing INR 10,000 (USD $150) - INR 50,000 (USD $750), followed by building 
brick/cement walls costing INR 50,000 (USD $750) - INR 100,000 (USD $1,500), and expansion 
(e.g., adding a room or a floor above) costing INR 
100,000 (USD $1,500)-INR 300,000 (USD $4,500). As 
expected, since a larger proportion of secure housing 
already has pucca housing (often with brick walls and 
concrete roofs), there is a greater interest in expansion, 
especially adding a floor above. Expansion is typically 
carried out to house growing families or generate 
rental income. Anecdotal data17 suggest that the rental 
yield on expansion investment is quite good. Adding 
a floor costs ~INR 200,000 (USD  $3,000) and it could 
be rented for INR 3,000 (USD $45) per month—a yield 
of 18 percent vs. a 1.5-4 percent rental yield in formal 
housing18 in India.
17 FSG primary interviews.
18 Retrieved from http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Asia/India/Rental-Yields.
FIGURE 23: ADDITION OF A FLOOR IN A 
NOTIFIED SLUM IN PUNE
Source: FSG primary interviews of 517 respondents 
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Upgrading a house from katcha to pucca also has a potential benefit in improving tenure security. 
The authorities may be less likely to demolish pucca homes due to the political ramifications and 
the media’s reaction, especially as people have lived in these homes for many years and have made 
significant investments in making it pucca.
Interestingly, there is a perception among some experts that households in slums do not want 
individual toilets due to a lack of space. However, FSG survey data show that, among households 
that do not have a toilet in transitional housing and notified slums, 87 percent want a toilet and 
only about 10 percent do not want a toilet at home due to a lack of space (see Figure 24). 
FIGURE 24: DEMAND FOR TOILETS IN TRANSITIONAL HOUSING AND NOTIFIED SLUMS
NEARLY 50 PERCENT OF OWNER-OCCUPANTS WHO FEEL 
EMPOWERED TO CONSTRUCT WANT LOANS TO CONSTRUCT
Owner-occupants in informal housing are excluded from formal mortgage finance. Banks and 
housing finance companies are barred from providing mortgages to houses that lack formal 
approvals, based on a Delhi High Court judgement.19 Therefore, home improvements and expan-
sion have to be funded by savings, personal, and/or informal loans. 
40 percent of owner-occupants in transitional housing and 71 percent of owner-occupants in 
secure housing believe they are allowed to construct (see Figure 12). Out of the owner-occupants 
19 The Delhi High Court explicitly barred banks and housing finance institutions from lending to “properties falling under the category 
unauthorized colonies unless and until they have been regularized and development and other charges paid.” (Kalyan Sanstha Welfare 
Organisation vs. Union of India and Others); RBI Notification (17 November 2006); NHB Circular (23 November 2006).
Source: FSG primary research of 313 households in slums in transitional housing and secure housing (notified slums)
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in transitional housing and secure housing who believe they are allowed to construct, 45 percent 
wanted a loan to undertake construction (46 percent in transitional housing and 44 percent in 
secure housing). According to one expert,20 “Demand for home improvement loans is likely to 
be very high. ~30 percent of microfinance (MFI) portfolios are used for housing purposes. People 
construct incrementally as the size of these loans is small.”
FIGURE 25: DEMAND FOR CONSTRUCTION LOANS IN TRANSITIONAL HOUSING
FIGURE 26: DEMAND FOR CONSTRUCTION LOANS IN SECURE HOUSING
20 Statement by FSG expert at a conference on low-income housing.
Source: FSG primary interviews of 184 owner-occupants in transitional housing
Source: FSG primary interviews of 283 owner-occupants in secure housing
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6. GOVERNMENT APPROACHES 
AND CHALLENGES WITH 
PROPERTY RIGHTS
CONTEXT
In practice, over the years the Indian government has implicitly improved formal and perceived 
tenure security. There has been a shift in philosophy from relocating slum dwellers to in situ 
redevelopment and more typically providing basic services. 
Thus, “strand by strand” owner-occupants are getting de 
facto property rights. However, the provision of services is 
sporadic, often spread over years, and the process is opaque. 
In other words, this approach of gradually improving liv-
ing conditions and de facto rights is inefficient and takes 
too long. Regularisation schemes for unauthorised housing 
are also sporadic. Granting formal property rights, even if 
limited (e.g., long-term leasehold rights), would be far more 
efficient and beneficial to the owner-occupants in terms of 
improving tenure security.
PERSPECTIVES OF THE BUREAUCRACY1
THE BUREAUCRACY IS CONFLICTED BETWEEN THE WELFARE OF THE POOR 
AND CONDONING ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
The key challenge for the bureaucracy in granting formal property rights is the justification for 
and potential ramifications of condoning illegal activity (e.g., squatting on land, lack of approvals). 
According to an Additional Secretary at the central government, “Government is faced with two 
conflicting objectives—welfare orientation while the other is an approach which is legally correct.”
1 Based on interviews with 14 high-ranking bureaucrats, experts from multilateral and bilateral agencies, think-tanks, and academia with 
deep knowledge of the government’s position.
Granting formal property rights is 
a more efficient alternative to the 
current sporadic processes to improve 
living conditions in informal housing.
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• Condoning illegal activity will set a precedent and encourage more such activity in the future. 
According to a senior bureaucrat in an urban development authority, “there is a general belief 
that ‘pattas’ have led to increased squatting.” 
• Condoning serious violations of city development plans (e.g., occupying untenable land, forest 
land). 
• Frequent regularisations of unauthorised colonies may undermine the sanctity of the urban 
planning process.
THE BUREAUCRACY IS MORE OPEN TO GRANTING LIMITED PROPERTY 
RIGHTS
While at some level the bureaucrats can see the logic of granting property rights such as the right 
to use, basic services, and perhaps transfer by inheritance from a welfare perspective, they are not 
in favour of granting property rights such as the right to transfer by sale. According to one senior 
bureaucrat: “Government cannot even consider giving freehold tenure to slum dwellers.” The 
concern over granting such property rights is due to the following reasons:
• Fear that beneficiaries will sell their house and move out, thereby rendering void the original 
purpose of giving beneficiaries better tenure security and improving in situ living conditions.
• Losing the option for the government to relocate owner-occupants.
According to a former chief secretary in a state government, “It is possible for the government 
to give limited land rights, for example a ‘patta’.” Another bureaucrat suggested that “‘occu-
pancy rights’ can be given to inhabitants who contribute towards the in situ redevelopment in old 
slums.”
ESTABLISHING CRITERIA AND PREVENTING FRAUD ARE MAJOR PRACTICAL 
CHALLENGES IN GRANTING FORMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
There are two additional challenges that the bureaucracy faces when implementing schemes to 
grant property rights:
• Designing the criteria to determine the eligibility of households is often not objective. Criteria 
such as a cut-off date of moving into the settlement, boundary of the settlement, plot area, or 
built-up area (particularly an issue with multiple storey or ground plus structures) are subject 
to long negotiations and political interests. According to a senior bureaucrat in a state govern-
ment, “in addition to a lack of standardised process for determining eligibility criteria, there is 
also a political process that influences other criteria (e.g., cut-off date) as local politicians have a 
vested interest in getting an area notified as a slum (or not).”
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• The risk of legal action or damage to their reputation, if schemes and policies meant for low 
income/poor informal housing owner-occupants result in unintended beneficiaries (e.g., slum-
lords2 or an affluent household). 
An official mentioned that their experience of offering pattas had “resulted in massive 
encroachment, falsification of records to establish eligibility for a patta and subsequent sale of the 
land for profit by the patta holder, who then made a fresh encroachment.”
REGULARISING UNAUTHORISED HOUSING IS LESS CHALLENGING FOR THE 
BUREAUCRACY
The owner-occupants of unauthorised housing usually have uncontested ownership or leasehold 
rights to the land, and typical violations are non-compliance with building codes, failure to convert 
land use to non-agricultural use, etc. These violations are considered less severe (compared to 
squatting on land), and hence the bureaucracy is perhaps more open to regularising unauthorised 
housing, especially small units, often with the imposition of a fine (e.g., development and other 
charges).3 As a result there have been multiple waves of regularisation for unauthorised housing in 
different cities (e.g., Building Penalisation Scheme in Hyderabad; regularisation schemes in 1977, 
2004 and 2014 in Delhi; and the Gunthewari regularisation scheme in 2003 and 2012 in Maha-
rashtra).
In addition to the stated reasons for not granting property rights, there seems to be an intrinsic 
aversion to condoning illegal activity (e.g., squatting) by granting formal property rights as it goes 
against the principles a bureaucrat stands for (e.g., ensuring the rule of law). Therefore bureaucrats 
seem to be more open to condoning relatively minor violations (e.g., not taking all approvals) in 
unauthorised housing vs. condoning “major” violations (e.g., “theft” or squatting).
2 Maharastra Slum Act definition: “‘Slumlord’ means a person, who illegally takes possession of any lands (whether belonging to Govern-
ment, local authority or any other person) or enters into or creates illegal tenancies or leave and licence agreements or any other agree-
ments in respect of such lands, or who constructs unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or gives such lands to any persons on 
rental or leave and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorised structures, or who knowingly gives financial aid 
to any persons for taking illegal possession of such lands, or for construction of unauthorised structure thereon, or who collects or at-
tempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation or other charges by criminal intimidation, or who evicts or attempts 
to evict any such occupiers by force without resorting to the lawful procedure, or who abets in any manner the doing of any of the above-
mentioned things…”
3 Implied by the Delhi High Court judgement that mentioned development and other charges (Kalyan Sanstha Welfare Organisation vs. 
Union of India and Others).
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7. INTERVENTIONS TO 
IMPROVE LIVING CONDITIONS 
IN INFORMAL HOUSING
CONTEXT
Informal housing is due to the persistent problem of lack of formal low-income housing in urban 
India. There are two parts to addressing the current situation:
1. Increasing Supply of Low-Income Housing: A range of levers could be applied here, 
including government-built subsidised housing, conducive policy for private sector low-income 
housing (without subsidies). Recommendations mentioned by the authors in the June 2013 
report State of the Low-Income Housing Market1 are still applicable.
2. Improving Living Conditions of Existing Informal Housing: As discussed in Objectives 
and Approach for the Report, Page 10, redevelopment and relocation as levers to improve the 
existing stock of informal housing have been inadequate to meet the demand. Informal hous-
ing is likely to exist for the foreseeable future. 
As seen in Government Approaches and Challenges with Property Rights, Page 43, informal 
housing owner-occupants are investing in improving their homes regardless of the level of tenure 
security (see Figure 21). Their planned investments (see Figure 22) are typically on physical improve-
ments to their houses (e.g., brick/cement walls, an additional floor, building a toilet). 
However, they mention basic services such as toilet provision (44 percent of households), water 
provision (36 percent of households), and drainage (28 percent of households) as the most pressing 
needs (see Figure 20).2 They also want roads and garbage collection services, but for these needs 
and basic services they are dependent on the government. Without formal property rights, infor-
mal housing owner-occupants cannot demand access to such infrastructure and utilities from the 
government, except under welfare schemes. The government provides them with these services 
based on budget and rollout schedules. Hence, in addition to interventions to help informal hous-
ing owner-occupants meet their needs, interested stakeholders should also work on interventions 
to improve the bundle of formal property rights. The latter is a more fundamental approach to 
1 Monitor Deloitte, State of the Low-Income Housing Market. 2013, Chapter 7: Way forward, p. 36.
2 Please note: These figures are based on average numbers calculated across segments.
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meeting these needs while also giving tenure security and increasing “wealth” (e.g., enabling 
exchange/sale of property).
INTERVENTIONS TO IMPROVE LIVING CONDITIONS IN INFORMAL 
HOUSING SETTLEMENTS
Needs, and therefore interventions, vary across the three categories of informal housing. The 
potential interventions described below either improve basic services or strengthen formal property 
rights (or both). These high-level interventions are based on actual examples in similar contexts, but 
their economic viability or feasibility has not been evaluated.
INSECURE HOUSING
50 percent of owner-occupants in insecure housing3 do not have an address or ID proof (e.g., 
Aadhar card or voter card) for the city (see section Segmenting Urban Housing in the Continuum of 
Tenure Security using a Property Rights Lens on Page 20) and are therefore unable to participate in 
schemes by the state government or ULB. They are amongst the most marginalised people in India 
and are unlikely to get access to services, as they are a relatively small group and lack even a “voice 
in the city” (i.e. they are unable to vote). NGOs could help owner-occupants to get a government 
ID (e.g., Aadhar card, voter ID card). It would not cost a lot, but would fundamentally enhance 
people’s lives.
TRANSITIONAL HOUSING
Owner-occupants in identified and recognised slums are seeking to either gain access to basic 
services or improve the quality of existing basic services (e.g., more water per capita, longer hours 
of water supply, more community toilets per capita). 
Interventions to Improve Basic Services 
• Improved Provision of Basic Services: Government is providing basic services to owner-occu-
pants and should accelerate improvement in the availability, quality, and quantity of service. 
• Decentralised Sewage Infrastructure: 87 percent of informal households without toilets 
want toilets (see Access to Services Improves from Insecure Housing to Secure Housing on Page 
36), but it may be expensive and practically difficult4 to get trunk infrastructure into transitional 
housing settlements. One option is to have decentralised sewage systems, such as small-bore 
3 FSG primary interviews of 50 owner-occupants in unidentified housing.
4 Space or topology; getting permission from a private landowner to extend trunk infrastructure (e.g. underground pipes).
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sewerage systems,5 which are comprised of inceptor tanks for removing solids and small-
bore sewers that carry wastewater. The small-bore sewers can discharge wastewater into the 
municipal trunk sewerage network, if available. Alternatively, wastewater can be treated locally 
in a decentralised treatment plant located within or at the periphery of the settlement. How-
ever, the system requires periodic de-sludging and disposal of solids from inceptor tanks, which 
requires management at the community level. This can be fulfilled by an operator on contract. 
There are examples of small-bore sewerage systems catering for marginalised communities in 
Pakistan, Peru, and South Africa.6 
• Clean Drinking Water Plants: Access to clean drinking water is not ubiquitous and varies 
widely across informal housing segments (from 32 percent in insecure housing to 76 percent in 
secure housing)7 and across cities (see Figure 17 on Page 35). To improve access to clean drink-
ing water, private sector and/or nonprofits could set 
up decentralised water filtration plants in informal 
settlements.8 The plants typically use reverse osmosis 
to process groundwater or water from municipal 
taps. In India, social enterprises and NGOs like 
APMAS, Eureka Forbes, Sarvajal, WaterHealth India, 
and Waterlife have installed decentralised water 
plants in urban informal housing settlements.
• Last-Mile Water Pipe Network: Given the limited 
and erratic supply of water in many urban areas, it 
is much easier for households with in-house taps 
to store water and cope with this than depend on 
community stand pipes, which entail waiting in line 
for limited water and often at odd hours. However, 
only 23 percent of households in transitional housing 
and 52 percent9 in secure housing have individual taps (see Figure 17, Page 35). A water pipe 
network could be built to extend the community water tap connection or trunk infrastructure 
at the periphery of the settlement to in-house taps. One example of such a community solution 
is a recognised slum (transitional housing) in Pune where owner-occupants hired local plumbers 
5 Government of India and World Bank WSP. A Guide to Decision making: Technology Options for Urban Sanitation in India, 2008.
6 Asian Development Bank, From Toilet to Rivers, 2014.
7 Please note: These figures are based on average numbers calculated for each segment across cities.
8 FSG interviews with clean drinking water service providers: “Setting up a plant in urban areas without some formal recognition entails [the] 
risk of attracting rent seekers, and so providers tend to set up kiosks where they have some permission. Getting permission for setting up 
plants in identified slums may be a challenge as the slums are not on any government records.”
9 Please note: These figures are based on average numbers calculated for each segment across cities.
Decentralized water plant by Sarvajal
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to build a pipe network.10 In Manila, Philippines,11 two firms with concessions for different areas 
extended water pipes to the boundaries or 
entry points of narrow lanes in informal hous-
ing settlements. In the absence of formal land 
titles, which was typically required for formal 
water provision, the two firms received assur-
ances from the local government that the 
informal communities would not be resettled 
for a minimum of five years.12 The commu-
nity then took responsibility for connecting 
its members (using hose-pipes or small-bore 
underground pipes) and paid a consolidated 
bill as per a bulk water meter reading for the 
lane or settlement.
• Larger-Size Unsecured Credit (Non-Mortgage) for House Improvements: Of the 40 
percent of households in transitional housing that believe they are “allowed to construct,” 62 
percent have constructed in the past and 86 percent plan to construct in the future (see Figure 
21). Owner-occupants typically fund construction by drawing on personal savings and formal 
(e.g., MFIs) and informal credit. Extending larger loans, typically greater than INR 100,000 
(USD $1,500), with longer payback periods (three to five years)13 will help owner-occupants to 
improve their housing (or at least do it earlier) and/or generate rental income. In the absence 
of clear titles, formal financial institutions can look for other factors to help them manage 
credit risk. An important one is “permanence”14 (i.e. the owner-occupant will be there for the 
duration of the loan). MFIs with personal loan products in slums use factors like employment 
history, length of residence in the current location, etc. to assess permanence. The challenge 
for MFIs in providing larger amounts for longer tenure is that regulations do not permit such 
large loans15 and longer repayment tenure results in asset-liability mismatch. For this reason, 
there appears to be an opportunity to give such loans through other lending organisations 
(e.g., Non-Banking Financial Companies or banks) or increasing the limits of loans MFIs can pro-
vide. Classifying these loans under the Reserve Bank of India’s Priority Sector Lending guidelines 
could improve access to and reduce the cost of credit to lenders in this space. The loans could 
10 FSG mapping of ~80 informal housing settlements.
11 WaterAid, Water utilities that work for poor people, 2009; Comeault, J. Manila Water Company, Improving Water and Wastewater Ser-
vices for the Urban Poor, 2007.
12 Cheng, D. The Politics of Pipes: The Persistence of Small Water Networks in Post-Privatization Manila, 2013.
13 As the loans are larger, the longer payback periods will make the monthly payments more affordable for customers.
14 Base criteria that all formal institutions (including MFIs) have for any kind of loans in slums is the permanence of the slum itself. They do 
not lend in slums that may be removed. They use factors like the type of slum (e.g. notified), age of the slum, political patronage enjoyed 
by owner-occupants and plans for infrastructure project in the area to assess the permanence of the slum.
15 NBFC-MFIs registered with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) are not permitted to lend beyond INR 60,000 (USD $900) in the first cycle and 
INR 100,000 (USD $1,500) in subsequent cycles, while total debt cannot exceed INR 100,000 (USD $1,500).
“We leave a storage drum below the tap always 
so that whenever water is released it gets 
collected. Earlier we used to wait for hours at 
the public [community] tap or run to line up 
whenever water was released. Even then getting 
water was not a guarantee” – owner-occupant 
in transitional housing in Hyderabad
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potentially be bundled with an insurance against eviction/demolition and insurance against 
collapse of the structure.16
Interventions to Improve the Bundle of Property Rights
• GIS (Geographic Information System) Mapping and Self-Enumeration: GIS mapping 
could help generate an address for individuals and establish boundaries of a house or settle-
ment. Identity and residence verification are basic requirements to qualify for beneficiary lists, 
hence self-enumeration may help individuals to qualify for beneficiary lists. GIS mapping and 
self-enumeration may also be useable by financial services providers to comply with “Know 
Your Customer” (KYC) norms and make the service commercially viable. Among the numerous 
cases of GIS mapping and self-enumeration are: 
 – Map Kibera project in Nairobi, Kenya;
 – Shelter Associates in Pune, India, for installing individual toilets in slums; and
 – An alliance of SPARC, NSDF, Mahila Milan and URDC17 to help slum dwellers in Cuttack 
qualify for a government housing scheme.
• Digital Document Locker: Occupants in informal housing typically build a portfolio of docu-
ments over time. These records are susceptible to damage in fire, rain, or flooding, which is not 
a rare occurrence and increases the vulnerability of a population with limited tenure security. 
A service to digitise documents and notarise and store records that are officially accepted by 
government as the equivalent of original documents has potential demand from informal hous-
ing occupants. The central government has launched a beta version of “DigiLocker,”18 a secure 
storage for digitised documents issued by government agencies or participating organisations.
• Grant Property Right Bundles: State governments could consider granting various bundles 
of property rights that are politically feasible and cater to diverse contexts of informal housing 
settlements. The formal property right to use and right to basic services, which bureaucrats are 
more comfortable with, could form the basic bundle. Additional rights (e.g., right to exchange, 
right to mortgage) could be added to the bundle, depending on local needs and feasibility. The 
rights could also be granted for a limited period (e.g., 5 or 10 years) as this may make it easier 
for the government to implement.19 
16 FSG expert interviews. While there is a need for such a product, it is not clear who would provide it and if the pricing would be appropri-
ate for the target customer segment.
17 SPARC—Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers; NSDF—National Slum Dwellers Federation; URDC—Urban and Development 
Resource Centre.
18 Retrieved from https://india.gov.in/spotlight/digilocker-online-document-storage-facility.
19 According to FSG experts, the bureaucracy may be hesitant to make a permanent change.
|   FSG50 
FIGURE 27: GIS MAPPING BY SHELTER ASSOCIATES FOR ITS SANITATION PROGRAM20
• Notification of Slums: Notify slums where owner-occupants have been living for many years. 
The slums could be located on private land (after considering objections raised by any party 
including a private landowner as per the process in the relevant State Slum Act) or public land 
where eviction is difficult (e.g., lack of alternate site to relocate owner-occupants, significant 
political ramifications). While notification seems difficult based on the views of bureaucrats, it 
significantly enhances the benefits for an owner-occupant, and hence should be done when 
possible. Considering the formation of new slums has slowed down considerably over the last 
five years, experts believe that this may make it more acceptable to government to notify long-
consolidated slums.
SECURE HOUSING
Owner-occupants in secure housing typically have access to basic services but need improvements 
in the quality of services (e.g., more quantity, greater continuity) and more formal property rights. 
In notified slums, owner-occupants will benefit from a de jure right to use (as opposed to de jure 
right against forced eviction) while in unauth-orised housing owner-occupants need the right to 
sell and the right to mortgage the property to leverage their asset.
20 Shelter Associates Spatial Slum Information. Retrieved from Shelter Associates website http://slum.shelter-associates.org/sites/default/files/
ra_factsheet_Lohagaon_Viman_Nagar__Yamuna_Nagar_Pune_S.N.199.compressed.pdf.
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Interventions to Improve Basic Services
• Improved provision of basic services, decentralised sewage infrastructure, clean drinking water 
plants described above are applicable for secure housing too.
Interventions to Improve the Bundle of Property Rights
• Regularise Unauthorised Housing: Legalise ‘pardonable’ violations in unauthorised hous-
ing structures (e.g., lack of some building approvals, illegal sub-division of land into plots) by 
imposing a penalty. Regularisation will enable owner-occupants to formally transfer the prop-
erty or get a mortgage.
• Credit Guarantee Fund: The government typically incentivises formal financial institutions 
for extending credit to financially excluded families by providing subsidies. To help catalyse a 
sustainable market-based solution for credit to informal housing customers, the government 
could set up a credit guarantee fund (to address loan defaults), as it has done in low-income 
housing, instead of subsidies. A credit guarantee fund is also likely to reduce the cost of credit 
for the borrower since the risk to the lender is reduced.
• Enable Formal Mortgages to Secure Housing: Currently, owner-occupants of secure hous-
ing typically get INR 50,000 (USD $750) to INR 100,000 (USD $1,500) in microfinance loans. 
While they have the right to use, they are not able to get mortgages as the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI)/National Housing Bank (NHB) does not allow mortgages for housing that does not 
have all the requisite approvals.21 Allowing secure housing that has some de jure rights to 
get formal mortgages would enable lower costs, larger amounts and longer duration credit 
to these low-income families. Recently in a special refinance facility,22 NHB has allowed “or 
by alternate security” in lieu of mortgageable title as collateral for mortgages. Demand for 
construction loans of INR 100,000 (USD $1,500) to INR 300,000 (USD $4,500) is sizeable (see 
Figures 25 and 26, Page 42). The estimated size of housing finance opportunity to serve  4.9 
million households in notified slums and unauthorised housing is INR 353 billion (USD $5.2 
billion).23 As is the case for transitional housing, classifying these loans under the Reserve Bank 
of India’s Priority Sector Lending guidelines could improve access to and reduce the cost of 
credit to lenders in this space. The mortgage could also potentially be combined with insurance 
against eviction/demolition and insurance against collapse.24
21 RBI Notification (17 November 2006); NHB Circular (23 November 2006) in accordance with a Delhi Court order.
22 NHB (2012) Special Urban Housing Refinance Scheme for Low Income Households.
23 See Appendix 4 for estimation methodology.
24 FSG expert interviews. While there is a need for such a product, it is not clear who would provide it and if the pricing would be appropri-
ate for the target customer segment.
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SUMMARY OF INTERVENTIONS AND APPLICABILITY TO THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES IN INFORMAL HOUSING
Interventions
Provider
Insecure 
housing
Transitional housing Secure housing
Private 
Sector/
NGO
Govt.
Unidentified 
slums
Identified 
slums
Recognised 
slums
Notified 
slums
Unauthorised 
housing
Apply for ID linked to the 
city
√ H M
Decentralise sewage 
infrastructure
√ H H H L
Clean drinking water 
plants
√ H H H M
Last-mile water pipe 
network
√ H H H
Larger-size unsecured 
credit (non-mortgage)
√ H H H M
GIS mapping and  
self-enumeration
√ H H H H
Digital document locker √ √ H H H H
Grant property right 
bundles
√ H H H H
Notification of slums √ H
Regularise unauthorised 
housing
√ H
Credit guarantee fund √ H L
Enable formal mortgage 
in secure housing
√ H H
Note: 
1. The interventions are described under the segment where they are most applicable; some owner-occupants in other segments may also want/use them.  
H = High; M = Medium; L = Low.
2. For interventions where the private sector (including NGOs) has/may have the capacity to deliver, this is indicated. Some of these interventions (e.g., 
decentralised sewage infrastructure, clean drinking water plants) could also be provided by the government.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INFORMAL HOUSING SETTLEMENTS 
MAPPED OR SURVEYED
CITIES SHORTLISTED FOR SURVEY AND RATIONALE FOR SELECTION
Delhi was chosen because it is a large urban agglomeration (representative of cities with popula-
tion greater than 10 million) with a history of policy interventions for tackling the growth of slums. 
In Delhi, the slum population accounts for nearly 20 percent of the urban population and an 
estimated 17 percent of urban households live in unauthorised housing. Delhi continues to see 
migration from neighbouring states and most of the migrants end up staying in informal housing.
Pune and Hyderabad were chosen as the relatively new and upcoming large cities (representative 
of Tier 1 cities) experiencing increasing urbanisation and consequent slum population growth. 
Taken together, the two cities account for nearly 9 percent of urban population and 12 percent 
of slum population of cities with a total population of over one million. Also a significant share of 
urban households, estimated at about 15 percent and 17 percent for Pune and Hyderabad, respec-
tively, live in unauthorised housing.
Cuttack was chosen as being representative of a typical Tier 2 town. Cuttack has seen decadal 
slum population growth of nearly 5.72 percent as against urban population growth of 1.3 per-
cent. Smaller cities (i.e. with population between 500,000 and one million) account for nearly 8.1 
percent of India’s urban population and 8.4 percent of slum population.
SLUMS AND UNAUTHORISED HOUSING SETTLEMENTS MAPPED 
An on-the-ground scouting exercise was undertaken in the four cities to identify locations for the 
quantitative survey. Realising that a wide range of informal housing categories existed, and to 
ensure adequate representation of the categories, ~60 days were invested in mapping over 80 
slums and unauthorised housing settlements across the four cities. Local NGOs working in slums 
and low-income neighbourhoods as well as urban planning organisations were leveraged to find 
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locations and confirm that the different types of informal housing categories were mapped. For the 
survey, 40 sites were chosen as representative samples of informal housing categories in the four 
cities. The sites were chosen based on the following criteria:
• Housing category (e.g., unauthorised housing, notified slum, recognised/identified slum and 
unidentified slum).
• Type of structure in the slums and unauthorised housing (e.g., katcha, semi-pucca and pucca).
• Location of the settlement (e.g., periphery or centre of the city).
• Ownership of the land (e.g., public, private, owned by occupants).
• Number of households in the settlement.
The tables that follow list the settlements mapped (according to city). Legend for the tables:
STATUS
N = Notified slum; NN = Recognised/Identified slum; NP = Notified slums with 
patta holders; UH = Unauthorised housing
LOCATION C = City; P = Periphery of the city
ENCROACHED Yes = Encroached; O = Owned Land; Mix = Mix of encroached and owned land
STRUCTURE
K = Katcha; SP = Semi-pucca; P = Pucca; G+ = Structures with 1 or more storeys
Percentages indicate share of HHs by structure based on observations and 
interviews with residents
ELECTRICITY, 
WATER, TOILET
IND = Independent; CMN = Community; OTH = Shared with neighbours or 
procured through other means
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DELHI
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Dev Nagar Khandala NN 700 C Public Yes 100% N Y N Y N Y Y
Pontum Pool NN 200 C Public Yes 100% N Y N Y N N N
Chitra Vihar JJ N 400 C Public Yes 100% Y Y N Y N Y Y
Bhagat Singh Jhuggi NN 420 C Public Yes 100% N Y N Y N Y N
Raghubir Nagar JJ NN/NP 2000 C Public Mix 10% 90% Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Jahangirpuri JJ NN/NP 1000 C Public Mix 10% 90% Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sundernagri JJ NN/NP 3000 C Public Mix 10% 90% Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sarhad Puri JJ N 200 C Public Yes 30% 70% Y Y N Y N Y Y
Camp Market NP 500 C Private Yes 10% 90% Y N Y N Y N Y
Nehru/JP Camp NN 800 C Public Yes 35% 30% 30% 5% Y Y N Y N Y Y
KP Mess NN 200 C Public Yes 100% Y N N Y N Y Y
Amrabhi Village U 40 P Private Yes 100% N Y N Y N N N
B Block UH 1500 C Private O 5% 95% Y N N Y Y Y N
Khanpur JJ NP 1200 C Public O 100% Y N Y N Y N Y
Vikas Vihar UH 500 P Private O 100% Y N Y N Y N Y
Mange Ram Park UH 100 P Private O 100% Y N Y N Y N Y
Budh Vihar UH 500 P Private O 100% Y N Y N Y N Y
Paul Colony UH 1000 P Private O 100% Y N Y N Y N Y
Ghyaspur Colony U 50 P Public Yes 100% Y N Y N Y N Y
Jasola Gaon U 40 P Public Yes 100% Y N Y N Y N Y
Near Dhaula Kuan U 50 C Public Yes 100% Y N Y N Y N Y
STATUS
N = Notified slum; NN = Recognised/Identified slum; NP = Notified slums with patta holders; UH = Unauthorised 
housing
LOCATION C = City; P = Periphery of the city
ENCROACHED Yes = Encroached; O = Owned Land; Mix = Mix of encroached and owned land
STRUCTURE
K = Katcha; SP = Semi-pucca; P = Pucca; G+ = Structures with 1 or more storeys
Percentages indicate share of HHs by structure based on observations and interviews with residents
ELECTRICITY, 
WATER, TOILET IND = Independent; CMN = Community; OTH = Shared with neighbours or procured through other means
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HYDERABAD
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Addagutta NP 1000+ P Public Yes 40% 40% 20% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Aashif Nagar NN 300 C Pvt Yes 100% Y N Y N N N
Jaipuri Colony NP 750 P Public Yes 5% 80% 15% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Patalagura NN 1100 P Public Yes 90% 10% Y Y Y N N N
Rasoolpura (Slum 1) NP 430 C Public Yes 40% 50% 10% Y N Y Y Y Y
Rasoolpura (Slum 2) NN N.A. C Private Yes 40% 40% 20% Y N Y Y Y Y
Musa Nagar NP 378 P Public Yes 30% 40% 30% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bojaguta Shivaji Nagar NN 350 C N.A. Yes 30% 35% 30% 5% Y N Y N Y Y
Gandhi Nagar Street NP 375 C Public Yes 3% 20% 80% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Siddiq Nagar NP 500 P Public Yes 100% Y N Y N Y Y
Slum Near Bridge NN 20 P Public Yes 100% N N Y N N N
Near Airport 1 U 20 P Private Yes 100% Y N N N N N
Near Airport 2 NP N.A. P Public O 100% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prakash Nagar UH N.A. P Private O 30% 50% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fateh Sultan UH N.A. P Private O 100% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Errakunta UH 2000 P Private O 100% 10% Y N Y Y Y N
Budwel Rajendra 
Nagar
UH 2000 P Private O 100% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Shanthi Nagar UH/N 200 P Private O 100% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
New Slum U N.A. P Private Yes 100% Y N N N N N
Sriram Street UH 350 P Private O 100% 10% Y N Y Y Y N
Slum near Boyenpally U 80 P Private O 100% 10% Y N N N N N
Sangeet Nagar UH N.A. P Private O 100% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
STATUS
N = Notified slum; NN = Recognised/Identified slum; NP = Notified slums with patta holders; UH = Unauthorised 
housing
LOCATION C = City; P = Periphery of the city
ENCROACHED Yes = Encroached; O = Owned Land; Mix = Mix of encroached and owned land
STRUCTURE
K = Katcha; SP = Semi-pucca; P = Pucca; G+ = Structures with 1 or more storeys
Percentages indicate share of HHs by structure based on observations and interviews with residents
ELECTRICITY, 
WATER, TOILET IND = Independent; CMN = Community; OTH = Shared with neighbours or procured through other means
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Shanti Nagar NN 1500 C Public Yes 95% 5% 5% Y Y Y N Y Y
Ambedkar Nagar NN 750 C Public Yes 100% 5% Y N Y N Y Y
Padmavati UH 362 P Private O 40% 60% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sai Nagar UH 100 P Private O 40% 60% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Indira Vasahat N 817 P Public Yes 100% 30% Y N Y Y Y Y
Yamuna Nagar N 432 C Public Yes 30% 70% 30% Y N Y Y Y Y
Khulewadi NN 347 C Private Yes 30% 70% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lokmanya Nagar NN 420 P Private Yes 100% Y N Y N Y Y
Landewadi NN 900 C Public Yes 30% 70% 20% Y N Y N Y Y
Gosavi Vasti UH 750 P Private O 100% 30% Y Y Y N Y Y
Tukai Nagar UH 850 P Private O 100% 30% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Anna Bhausathe NN 350 P Public Yes 20% 80% Y N Y N Y Y
Kala Khadak NN 1000 P Private Yes 10% 20% 70% Y N Y N Y Y
Unnamed UI 30 P Private Yes 100% N N Y N N N
Ambika Nagar UH N.A. P Private O 40% 60% 10% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rajiv Gandhi N/NN 87 C Mix Yes 50% 50% 10% Y N Y Y Y Y
Unnati Nagar UH 1000 P Private O 100% 40% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bundelkar Nagar UH 300 P Private O 100% 40% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Navbharat Nagar 
Colony
UH 300 P Private O 100% 40% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sasane Nagar UH 700 P Private O 100% 40% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bhairavnath UH 1000 P Private O 100% 40% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Yewalewadi UH 1250 P Private O 100% 40% Y Y Y Y Y Y
Gokul Nagar UH 1500 P Private O 100% 40% Y Y Y Y Y Y
New Slum UI 50 P Private Yes 100% Y N Y N N N
STATUS
N = Notified slum; NN = Recognised/Identified slum; NP = Notified slums with patta holders; UH = Unauthorised 
housing
LOCATION C = City; P = Periphery of the city
ENCROACHED Yes = Encroached; O = Owned Land; Mix = Mix of encroached and owned land
STRUCTURE
K = Katcha; SP = Semi-pucca; P = Pucca; G+ = Structures with 1 or more storeys
Percentages indicate share of HHs by structure based on observations and interviews with residents
ELECTRICITY, 
WATER, TOILET IND = Independent; CMN = Community; OTH = Shared with neighbours or procured through other means
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CUTTACK
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Harianpur-Bidansi N 50 C Public O 45% 50% 5% N Y N Y N Y Y
Imam Nagar NN 400 P Both Yes 70% 30% Y Y N Y N N N
Sathi Gumpha N 35 P Private Yes 50% 50% N Y N Y N N N
Stewart Patna NP 100 C Public Yes 5% 95% Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deer Park NN 165 P Public Yes 80% 20% Y Y N Y N N N
Beharompuria Basti NN 100 C Public Yes 30% 70% N Y N Y N N Y
Gandhi Palli NP 500 C Public O 100% Y N Y Y Y N Y
Pilgrim Road NN 800 C Public Yes 30% 70% Y Y N Y N Y Y
Munda Sahi NN 300 P Public Yes 60% 40% N Y N Y N N N
Tinnath Sahi NN 50 P Public Yes 80% 20% N Y N Y N N N
Puriaghat Bauri Sahi NP 125 C Private Yes 20% 30% 30% 20% Y Y N Y N Y Y
Khatajodi Bihar NN 350 C Public Yes 80% 20% N Y N Y N N N
Alisha Bazar NP 200 C Public Yes 80% 20% Y N Y Y Y Y Y
Hadiya Patta NN 50 C Public Yes 100% N N N Y N N N
Jagathpura Truck 
Terminal
U 50 P Public Yes 100% N N N Y N Y N
Rajabagicha UH 90 C Public O 80% 20% Y N Y Y Y Y Y
Jahngriman-gada NP 185 C Public Yes 80% 20% Y N Y Y Y Y Y
STATUS
N = Notified slum; NN = Recognised/Identified slum; NP = Notified slums with patta holders; UH = Unauthorised 
housing
LOCATION C = City; P = Periphery of the city
ENCROACHED Yes = Encroached; O = Owned Land; Mix = Mix of encroached and owned land
STRUCTURE
K = Katcha; SP = Semi-pucca; P = Pucca; G+ = Structures with 1 or more storeys
Percentages indicate share of HHs by structure based on observations and interviews with residents
ELECTRICITY, 
WATER, TOILET IND = Independent; CMN = Community; OTH = Shared with neighbours or procured through other means
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APPENDIX 2: APPROACH TO INFORMAL AND FORMAL URBAN 
HOUSING SIZING
SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION
Data was collected from various sources including India’s 2011 Census, NSSO (69th Round, July-
December 2012) and UN (2009). The census gives segregated population data on households in 
notified, recognised, and identified slums, as well as homeless households. NSSO gives segregated 
data on households in notified and non-notified slums whereas UN data provide figures on slum 
and non-slum population.  
Census data was used wherever possible, as these represent a complete enumeration that capture 
information for the entire Indian population. NSSO data are based on sample surveys, and UN data 
are estimated based on statistical tools. Thus, the number of households in urban India, notified, 
recognised slums, and identified slums, as well as homeless households, were adopted from the 
2011 Census.
Available literature and expert interviews provided the basis to estimate the sizing of other seg-
ments.
COMPUTATION FOR UNAUTHORISED HOUSING
Based on the available data from various cities, unauthorised housing constitutes 15-25 percent of 
urban households in India.1 
City  Percent of total households 
in unauthorised housing
Delhi 18
Jaipur 35
Indore 15
Hyderabad 17
Pune 15
Computation for unidentified slums in India are estimated to be 0.1 –3.9 percent of total urban 
households. This was done based on three sources:
• Estimate 1: 0.1 percent - 1 percent (FSG field-based observation).
• Estimate 2: 0.1 percent (based on M.S. Sriram’s GIS mapping of slums in Bangalore).
1 Delhi: Delhi Economic Survey, 2008-09; Jaipur and Indore: MHUPA case study Indore and Jaipur; Hyderabad: The Hindu, Special drive on 
BPS, LRS clearance, May 2013; Pune: Mashal, Housing Study for Pune Municipal Corporation, 2009-10.
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• Estimate 3: 3.85 percent (any urban household with some level of tenure security, e.g., a 
household in an “identified” slum, will at least have upgraded from grass/thatch/bamboo/
wood/mud and polythene/plastic etc. as roof materials. Number of non-slum urban households 
with grass/thatch/bamboo/wood/mud or plastic/polythene as roof materials2 = 3.85 percent of 
total urban households).
• Using this estimate, the number of households in unidentified slums is 0.08-3.04 million house-
holds.
Calculation for total number of formal houses in India was worked out as total urban households 
in India less number of households in unidentified, recognised slums, notified slums and unau-
thorised colonies along with homeless households. This was calculated to be 42.1-52.94 million 
households.
SUMMARY OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL HOUSING SIZING ESTIMATES
2 Census 2011.
Note: Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation (MoHUPA) uses data from Census 2011
a. For basis of estimates please see next page; b. Census i.e. a complete enumeration is always preferred over NSSO i.e. a  sample survey and 
UN data which is an estimation; c. UN data in million population converted to HHs using average HH size of 4.5 from DHS (source and basis 
for UN data); average household size is 4.7 in Census 2011; d. Census 2011; e. NSSO slum survey 2013; f. NSSO Consumer Exp survey. 2012; 
g. Remainder; h. MDG indicators, UN 2014
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APPENDIX 3: IMPACT OF NOTIFICATION OF A SETTLEMENT 
UNDER THE SLUM ACT ON MARKET VALUE OF UNDERLYING 
LAND
CASE: THE KARNATAKA SLUM AREAS (IMPROVEMENT AND CLEARANCE) 
ACT, 1973
Terms of Compensation
• 300X property tax payable on the date of publication of notice to acquire land. 
• Where property tax is not payable for the land, the property tax payable for the adjacent land 
will be used to calculate compensation.
Calculation for Compensation: Rajendra Nagar in Koramangala Area of Bengaluru
• Market rate (2009): INR 78,030 (USD 1,160) per square yard 
• Property tax (2009) for vacant land: INR 36 (USD 0.50) per square yard 
Compensation @ 300X = INR 10,800 (USD 160) per square yard or 14 percent of market value.
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APPENDIX 4: APPROACH FOR ESTIMATING TOTAL MARKET SIZE 
FOR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION LOANS OF INR 100,000-300,000 
IN SECURE HOUSING
1. Number of households in notified slums (census) and unauthorised housing (average number 
of households in unauthorized housing in FSG informal housing size estimate).
2. Share of owner-occupants (excluding renters)3 in informal housing from census and NSSO 
data.
3. Share of owner-occupants who believe they are “allowed” to construct (FSG quantitative 
survey).
4. Share of owner-occupants from (C) that either: i) plan to construct and need a loan; or ii) do 
not plan to construct due to lack of money but will construct if given a loan (FSG quantitative 
survey).
5. Share of households that estimate home construction costs between INR 100,000 and INR 
300,000 (FSG quantitative survey).
6. Addressable Market Size (number of households) E = A X B X C X D X E
Opportunity Size (INR) G = F X INR 200,000 (average loan size for INR 100,000 – INR 300,000).
Opportunity for loans in INR 100,000-300,000 for construction in secure housing
Notified slums
Unauthorised 
housing
A Total households 4,965,000 15,770,000
B Share of owner-occupants 70.20%* 62%#
C Share of owner-occupants who believe they are "allowed" to construct 67.00% 75%
D Share of owner-occupants (C) that need loans to construct 46% 43%
E % of HHs with construction costs in the range INR 100,000-300,000 35.70% 43.90%
F Addressable market size (#HHs) 383,493 1,384,260
G Opportunity size (avg. loan size of INR 200,000) (in millions) INR 76,699 INR 276,852
* Census; # NSSO
Total opportunity size in secure housing for loans in INR 100,000-300,000 range = INR 353 billion.
3 Non-resident owners who are renting out their house may also want to take out loans for house improvement. However, to provide a 
conservative estimate, these owners have been excluded.
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APPENDIX 5: QUESTIONS FOR THE FIELD
Below are some additional key questions raised by experts, participants at  
dissemination events, and the FSG team that will require further research.
1. How can the rights of renters in informal housing be addressed?
2. How can the interests and rights of non-residential entities (e.g., shops, schools, clinics) in 
informal housing be addressed?
3. What is the impact on self-investment and living conditions in settlements where de jure 
property rights (e.g., patta) were granted?
4. What is the “poverty premium” incurred due to poor access or quality of basic services in 
informal housing?
5. What role might innovations like Aadhar play in the flow of rights and public services in infor-
mal housing?
6. What is the past behaviour and future plans for construction amongst owner-occupants who 
believe they are not “allowed” to construct?
7. How might the government be supported in updating archaic laws and urban planning prac-
tices that artificially restrict affordable housing supply?
8. How can the safety of informal housing structures be improved?
9. How do the recommendations in the report compare with recent policy announcements (e.g., 
Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana)?
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ACRONYMS USED IN THE 
REPORT
DPSP: Directive Principles of State Policy
GIS: Geographic Information System
HH: Household
INR: Indian Rupee
JNNURM: Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban 
Renewal Mission
KYC: Know Your Customer
LIH: Low-income Housing
MFI: Microfinance Institution
MHUPA: Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Poverty Alleviation, Government of India
MIM: Monitor Inclusive Markets
MoUD: Ministry of Urban Development, 
Government of India
NBFC: Non-Banking Financial Company
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NHB: National Housing Bank
NSDF: National Slum Dwellers Federation
NSSO: National Sample Survey Organisation
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development
PIPE: Programme for Improving Private 
Preschool Education
PPP: Purchasing Power Parity
PVC: Polyvinyl Chloride
RBI: Reserve Bank of India
SPARC: Society For the Promotion of Area 
Resource Centers
TDR: Transfer of Development Rights
ULB: Urban Local Body
UN: United Nations
URDC: Urban and Development Resource 
Centre
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